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  Authority	  
In	  many	  public	  cases	  intruders	  have	  managed	  to	  remain	  undetected	  inside	  victim's	  network	  or	  sys-­‐
tems	  a	  very	  long	  time.	  Sometimes	  it	  has	  taken	  over	  two	  years	  until	  detection	  was	  made	  and	  during	  
that	  that	  time	  most	  of	  the	  targets	  have	  most	  probably	  been	  monitored	  and	  audited.	  	  Whether	  audit	  
or	  monitoring	  process	  has	  failed,	  or	  used	  tools	  and	  processes	  don’t	  cover	  intrusion	  detection.	  
This	  thesis	  aimed	  at	  narrowing	  the	  gap	  between	  IT	  security	  audit	  and	  intrusion	  detection	  by	  inspect-­‐
ing	  attack	  methods	  and	  signs	  of	  intrusions.	  Audit	  tools	  were	  then	  developed	  to	  cover	  the	  findings	  
and	  were	  then	  tested	  on	  live	  environments.	  Current	  audit	  process	  and	  it’s	  affects	  to	  audit	  results	  was	  
analyzed	  and	  purpose	  was	  to	  find	  necessary	  changes.	  Thesis	  concentrated	  on	  finding	  anomalies	  from	  
operating	  systems	  and	  network	  traffic	  within	  given	  guidelines	  of	  audit	  processes	  and	  applicable	  laws.	  
Audit	  process	  and	  law	  was	  inspected	  from	  Finland's	  perspective,	  but	  technical	  research	  area	  was	  
worldwide.	  
Keywords	  	  



























































AD	  	   Active	  Directory	  
APT	  	   Advanced	  Persistent	  Threat	  
ASLR	  	   Address	  space	  layout	  randomization	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   Command&Control	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   Comma	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  Value	  
DEP	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  Execution	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  Algorithm	  
DLL	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DNS	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  System,	  Domain	  Name	  Service	  
EMET	   Enhanced	  Mitigation	  Experience	  Toolkit	  
FICORA	  	   Finnish	  Communications	  Regulatory	  Authority	  
GID	   Group	  ID	  




HKLM	   HKey_Local_Machine	  
HTML	   HyperText	  Markup	  Language	  
HTTP	  	   Hypertext	  Transfer	  Protocol	  
HTTPS	  	   Hypertext	  Transfer	  Protocol	  Secure	  
ID	   Identification/Identity/Identifier	  
IDS	   Intrusion	  Detection	  System	  
IP	  	   Internet	  Protocol	  
IPS	   Intrusion	  Prevention	  System	  
ISACA	   Information	  Systems	  Audit	  and	  Control	  Association	  
ISC	   Internet	  Security	  Consortium	  
MAC	   Media	  Access	  Control	  address	  
MSI	   Microsoft	  Installer	  
NSA	   National	  Security	  Agency	  
PID	   Process	  Identifier	  
SAM	   Security	  Accounts	  Manager	  
SFC	   System	  File	  Check	  
SQL	   Structured	  Query	  Language	  
SSL	   Secure	  Socket	  Layer	  
TCP	  	   Transmission	  Control	  Protocol	  
TLS	   Transport	  Layer	  Security	  
TOR	   The	  Onion	  router	  
	   	   	  
	  
UAC	  	   User	  Account	  Control	  
UDP	  	   User	  Datagram	  Protocol	  
UID	   User	  ID	  
USB	   Universal	  Serial	  Bus
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In	  most	  publicly	  reported	  cases,	  the	  attackers	  had	  already	  been	  inside	  the	  compro-­‐
mised	  systems	  for	  weeks,	  months,	  or	  even	  years	  before	  the	  intrusions	  were	  finally	  
detected.	  Similar	  cases	  have	  been	  found	  in	  Finland	  and	  in	  other	  countries	  and	  	  
organizations	  all	  over	  the	  world.	  One	  public	  example	  is	  from	  Japanese	  Finance	  Minis-­‐
try	  that	  was	  infected	  with	  trojans.	  According	  to	  the	  news,	  the	  trojan	  was	  free	  to	  steal	  
confidential	  data	  from	  January	  2010	  to	  November	  2011.	  (Techworld,	  2012).	  That	  is	  
almost	  two	  years	  and	  probably	  plenty	  of	  information	  was	  lost.	  
	  
Sometimes	  intrusions	  have	  been	  made	  by	  professionals,	  but	  in	  some	  cases	  there	  has	  
simply	  been	  malware	  or	  trojan	  infections	  that	  has	  not	  been	  noticed	  by	  anyone.	  Dur-­‐
ing	  this	  time	  systems	  have	  probably	  been	  monitored	  by	  administrators	  or	  even	  au-­‐
dited	  by	  internal	  or	  external	  organizations.	  Either	  there	  has	  not	  been	  proper	  moni-­‐
toring	  by	  administrators,	  auditing	  included	  only	  paper	  review	  or	  technical	  audit	  fo-­‐
cused	  only	  on	  compliance.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  signs	  of	  intrusions	  were	  there	  and	  visible	  
in	  the	  monitoring	  systems	  but	  were	  simply	  ignored	  by	  administrators	  or	  auditors	  for	  
some	  reason.	  It	  is	  also	  possible	  that	  audit	  method	  and	  tools	  did	  not	  enable	  detection	  
of	  intrusions	  or	  other	  malicious	  activity.	  
	  
	  
1.1. Threats	  and	  Mitigations	  
	  
Some	  networks	  or	  information	  systems	  are	  disconnected	  from	  the	  Internet.	  This	  
usually	  means	  that	  there	  is	  no	  direct	  interaction	  with	  the	  Internet,	  but	  information	  
always	  flows	  there	  and	  back,	  through	  security	  gateways,	  removable	  devices	  or	  due	  to	  
the	  actions	  of	  the	  users	  or	  administrators.	  Therefore	  even	  a	  closed	  system	  can	  be	  
infected	  or	  misused.	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Nowadays	  information	  systems	  that	  are	  connected	  to	  the	  Internet	  rely	  on	  security	  
offered	  by	  firewalls,	  proxy/antivirus	  servers	  and	  Intrusion	  detection,	  IDS	  and	  Intru-­‐
sion	  Prevention,	  IPS	  systems.	  If	  policies	  are	  well	  applied,	  logs	  are	  collected	  statistical	  
reports	  about	  events	  generated	  from	  them;	  however,	  it	  is	  good	  to	  notice	  that	  perim-­‐
eter	  defense	  is	  not	  always	  the	  key	  to	  detection	  or	  prevention	  of	  intruders.	  
	  
	  
In	  some	  cases,	  compromised	  servers	  are	  hosted	  on	  target	  organizations’	  
networks	  after	  successful	  infiltration.	  This	  means	  that	  network	  defenses	  
placed	  at	  the	  perimeter	  will	  not	  detect	  standard	  IXESHE	  (name	  of	  the	  
APT)	  network	  traffic	  because	  communication	  occurs	  internally.	  The	  at-­‐
tackers	  can	  communicate	  through	  an	  alternate	  means	  with	  the	  internal	  
C&C	  server	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  detection.	  	  (Trendmicro	  2012)	  
 
 
Perimeter	  defense	  is	  efficient	  if	  the	  traffic	  flows	  through	  perimeter	  equipment	  that	  
actually	  inspects	  the	  traffic	  instead	  of	  just	  acting	  as	  port	  filters	  and	  log	  collectors.	  
Statistical	  analysis	  of	  traffic	  is	  a	  must,	  however,	  sleeping	  malware	  or	  sparsely	  com-­‐
municating	  APT	  means	  that	  anomalies	  stay	  under	  the	  radar	  without	  raising	  alarms.	  
Additionally,	  when	  low	  activity	  is	  combined	  with	  use	  of	  normal	  communication	  pro-­‐
tocol	  features,	  the	  chances	  to	  detect	  advanced	  threats	  is	  almost	  zero.	  According	  to	  
news	  and	  security	  conference	  subjects	  the	  point	  of	  interest	  is	  APT,	  Advanced	  Persis-­‐
tent	  Treat.	  	  
	  
“It	  is	  a	  well-­‐known	  fact	  that	  virus	  scanners	  do	  not	  find	  APT	  type	  malware.	  Based	  on	  
CERT-­‐FI's	  experience,	  most	  APT	  incidents	  are	  discovered	  either	  by	  accident	  or	  after	  a	  
notification	  obtained	  from	  friendly	  third	  parties.”	  	  (CERT-­‐FI	  APT-­‐ohje)	  
	  
There	  are	  many	  articles	  and	  papers	  about	  APT	  detection.	  They	  usually	  provide	  exam-­‐
ples	  for	  detection	  of	  specific	  APTs,	  however,	  the	  message	  is	  always	  the	  same:	  	  deeper	  
statistical	  and	  technical	  analysis	  has	  to	  be	  made.	  (Trendmicro,	  2012)	  If	  an	  attack	  is	  
well	  made,	  it	  is	  typically	  not	  detected	  by	  security	  products	  like	  firewalls,	  antivirus,	  
intrusion	  detection	  or	  intrusion	  prevention	  systems.	  Signs	  of	  the	  possible	  intrusion	  of	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infections	  are	  not	  necessarily	  noticed	  without	  outside	  notification	  or	  help.	  Since	  in-­‐




Once	  they	  are	  inside	  the	  victim	  organization,	  attackers	  typically	  have	  
plenty	  of	  time	  to	  reach	  their	  ultimate	  objective	  –	  whether	  that’s	  stealing	  
intellectual	  property	  or	  financial	  assets.	  The	  median	  number	  of	  days	  
from	  the	  first	  evidence	  of	  compromise	  to	  when	  the	  attack	  was	  identified	  
was	  416	  days.	  (Mandiant, 2013)	  
	  
	  
According	  the	  report,	  the	  median	  number	  of	  days	  from	  compromise	  to	  detection	  can	  
take	  over	  a	  year	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  many	  years.	   
	  
	  
1.2. Scope	  of	  Thesis	  and	  Implemented	  Research	  Method	  
	  
The	  thesis	  is	  aimed	  at	  infiltration	  detection	  within	  main	  operating	  systems	  and	  to	  a	  
passive	  network	  analysis.	  The	  applications	  and	  their	  configurations	  were	  left	  out,	  
because	  it	  cannot	  be	  predicted	  what	  applications	  are	  installed	  beforehand,	  and	  the	  
amount	  of	  application	  specific	  checks	  would	  be	  enormous.	  	  
 
To	  draft	  Proof	  of	  Concepts	  from	  the	  found	  hacking	  methods	  the	  following	  setups	  
were	  inspected.	  
	  
• Windows	  7	  SP1	  64	  bit,	  joined	  to	  domain	  
• Windows	  8	  64	  bit,	  joined	  to	  domain	  
• Windows	  2012	  server	  64	  bit,	  Active	  directory	  with	  DHCP,	  IIS	  and	  
DNS	  services	  
• Windows	  2008	  server	  R2	  64	  bit,	  Active	  directory	  with	  DHCP	  and	  DNS	  
services	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• Ubuntu	  server	  12.04,	  Squid	  proxy	  
• Kali	  linux	  (debian),	  	  
• Ubuntu	  Desktop	  linux	  12.04	  
• Centos	  Linux 
	  
Windows	  XP	  and	  Windows	  2003	  server	  were	  left	  out	  because	  they	  were	  running	  out	  
of	  official	  support	  during	  the	  thesis	  writing	  process.	  	  The	  researched	  hacking	  tricks	  
are	  presented	  as	  examples	  and	  do	  not	  include	  all	  possible	  methods	  that	  hackers	  use.	  
The	  presented	  sample	  scripts	  and	  commands	  are	  meant	  to	  serve	  only	  as	  examples	  of	  
different	  data	  gathering	  methods;	  however,	  they	  can	  be	  used	  to	  check	  similar	  details	  
since	  the	  command	  or	  concept	  of	  the	  script	  is	  the	  same.	  
	  
The	  research	  method	  implemented	  was	  an	  empirical	  study	  of	  system	  flaws,	  hacking	  
methods	  and	  signs	  they	  leave.	  While	  different	  results	  were	  found	  they	  were	  com-­‐
pared	  to	  used	  audit	  process	  and	  tools	  to	  check	  if	  there	  already	  was	  a	  detection	  
method.	  If	  a	  detection	  method	  was	  not	  found,	  an	  experimental	  method	  was	  used	  to	  
test	  the	  issue	  on	  test	  environment	  and	  the	  method	  was	  developed	  in	  practice.	  The	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International	  Information	  Systems	  Security	  Certification	  Consortium,	  (ISC)²	  defines	  
audit	  as	  an	  independent	  review	  and	  examination	  of	  system	  records	  and	  activities	  
that	  test	  for	  the	  adequacy	  of	  system	  controls,	  ensure	  compliance	  with	  established	  
policy	  and	  operational	  procedures,	  and	  recommend	  any	  indicated	  changes	  in	  con-­‐
trols,	  policy,	  and	  procedures.	  Whether	  the	  question	  is	  about	  Information	  systems	  
audit	  or	  security	  audit	  it	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  compliance.	  
	  
	  
2.2. Security	  Audit	  
	  
The	  goal	  of	  security	  audit	  is	  to	  help	  the	  target	  system	  reach	  or	  maintain	  a	  certain	  
security	  and	  trust	  level.	  	  
	  
A	  security	  audit	  is	  a	  systematic	  evaluation	  of	  the	  security	  of	  a	  company's	  
information	  system	  by	  measuring	  how	  well	  it	  conforms	  to	  a	  set	  of	  estab-­‐
lished	  criteria.	  A	  thorough	  audit	  typically	  assesses	  the	  security	  of	  the	  
system's	  physical	  configuration	  and	  environment,	  software,	  information	  
handling	  processes,	  and	  user	  practices.	  Security	  audits	  are	  often	  used	  to	  
determine	  regulatory	  compliance,	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  legislation.	  
(Searchcio.techtarget.com)	  
	  
Security	  audit	  might	  include	  penetration	  testing	  where	  a	  system	  or	  an	  organization	  is	  
tested	  for	  their	  real	  ability	  to	  prevent	  and	  detect	  intrusions.	  This	  typically	  depends	  on	  
the	  target	  whether	  it	  is	  a	  specific	  system	  or	  a	  whole	  IT	  infrastructure.	  Some	  systems	  
have	  requirements	  that	  the	  security	  audit	  has	  to	  be	  passed	  successfully	  before	  it	  can	  
be	  taken	  into	  production.	  However,	  the	  major	  part	  of	  the	  cases	  are	  systems	  that	  
have	  never	  been	  technically	  audited	  or	  audited	  at	  all	  since	  the	  security	  culture	  has	  
been	  missing.	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2.3. Audit	  Process	  
	  
An	  audit	  process	  can	  be	  carried	  out	  in	  many	  ways;	  however,	  certain	  frameworks	  have	  
been	  developed	  to	  keep	  the	  audit	  methods	  and	  results	  comparable.	  The	  most	  fa-­‐
mous	  of	  them	  is	  Control	  Objectives	  for	  Information	  and	  Related	  Technology	  (COBIT)	  
framework	  created	  by	  Information	  Systems	  Audit	  and	  Control	  Association,	  ISACA.	  
ISACA	  is	  an	  independent,	  nonprofit,	  global	  association.	  ISACA	  engages	  in	  the	  devel-­‐
opment,	  adoption	  and	  use	  of	  globally	  accepted	  knowledge	  and	  practices	  for	  infor-­‐
mation	  systems.	  One	  of	  the	  practices	  is	  information	  security	  audit	  and	  table	  1	  pre-­‐
sents	  their	  classifications	  of	  audit..	  
	  
Table	  1	  Broad	  classification	  of	  IS	  audit	  according	  to	  ISACA’s	  web	  site	  	  
(The	  IS	  audit	  process,	  Isaca.org)	  
	  




Physical	  security,	  power	  supply,	  air	  conditioning,	  





Security	  review	  of	  the	  operating	  systems,	  database	  
management	  systems,	  all	  system	  administration	  





Application	  could	  be	  payroll,	  invoicing,	  a	  web-­‐
based	  customer	  order	  processing	  system	  or	  an	  en-­‐
terprise	  resource	  planning	  system	  that	  actually	  
runs	  the	  business.	  Review	  of	  such	  application	  soft-­‐
ware	  includes	  access	  control	  and	  authorizations,	  
validations,	  error	  and	  exception	  handling,	  business	  
process	  flows	  within	  the	  application	  software	  and	  
complementary	  manual	  controls	  and	  procedures.	  
Additionally,	  a	  review	  of	  the	  system	  development	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lifecycle	  should	  be	  completed.	  
Network	  securi-­‐
ty	  review	  
Review	  of	  internal	  and	  external	  connections	  to	  the	  
system,	  perimeter	  security,	  firewall	  review,	  router	  
access	  control	  lists,	  port	  scanning	  and	  intrusion	  




Existence	  and	  maintenance	  of	  fault	  tolerant	  and	  
redundant	  hardware,	  backup	  procedures	  and	  stor-­‐
age,	  and	  documented	  and	  tested	  disaster	  recov-­‐
ery/business	  continuity	  plan.	  
Data	  integrity	  
review	  
The	  purpose	  of	  this	  is	  scrutiny	  of	  live	  data	  to	  verify	  
adequacy	  of	  controls	  and	  impact	  of	  weaknesses,	  as	  
noticed	  from	  any	  of	  the	  above	  reviews.	  Such	  sub-­‐
stantive	  testing	  can	  be	  done	  using	  generalized	  au-­‐




ISACA	  maintains	  an	  accepted	  concept	  of	  the	  audit;	  however,	  there	  are	  differences	  
here	  between	  audit	  processes	  among	  countries	  and	  organizations.	  	  
	  
	  
2.4. Audit	  Process	  in	  Finland	  
	  
In	  Finland,	  official	  audit	  guidelines	  are	  maintained	  by	  Finnish	  Communications	  Regu-­‐
latory	  Authority,	  FICORA.	  These	  guidelines	  have	  to	  be	  used	  by	  companies	  or	  organi-­‐
sations	  that	  have	  gained	  an	  official	  approval	  to	  carry	  out	  information	  security	  audits	  
within	  governmental	  organizations.	  (Ohje	  tietoturvallisuuden	  arviointilaitoksille).	  The	  
guideline	  divides	  an	  audit	  process	  into	  two	  sections	  :	  Administrative	  and	  Technical.	  
	  
	  





The	  purpose	  of	  an	  administrative	  audit	  is	  to	  verify	  that	  a	  system	  is	  documented	  and	  
to	  discover	  how	  the	  security	  responsibilities	  are	  organized.	  Table	  2	  below	  presents	  
the	  required	  targets	  of	  an	  administrative	  audit.	  
	  
Table	  2	  Targets	  of	  administrative	  audit	  	  
	  
Audit	  target	   Details	  
Interviews	  	   At	  least	  following	  persons	  and/or	  groups	  are	  interviewed:	  mainte-­‐
nance	  staff,	  development	  and	  users	  
Documentation	  
	  
At	  least	  following	  documentations	  are	  reviewed:	  network	  dia-­‐






The	  purpose	  of	  a	  technical	  audit	  is	  to	  verify	  that	  the	  target	  is	  secure	  and	  in	  compli-­‐
ance	  with	  requirements.	  If	  there	  are	  specific	  security	  requirements	  like	  minimum	  
password	  length,	  they	  are	  checked	  accordingly.	  Table	  3	  presents	  the	  required	  targets	  
of	  a	  technical	  audit.	  
	  
Table	  3	  Targets	  of	  technical	  audit	  
	  




Network	  traffic	  to	  and	  from	  the	  system	  being	  audited	  is	  captured	  
and	  analyzed.	  Purpose	  is	  to	  verify	  network	  diagrams	  and	  system	  
behavior	  as	  pictured	  in	  system	  documentation.	  
	  






Operating	  system,	  software,	  hardware	  and	  application	  configura-­‐
tions	  are	  reviewed.	  Configurations	  are	  checked	  to	  verify	  that	  sys-­‐




Operating	  systems,	  software	  or	  network	  interfaces	  are	  scanned	  for	  
open	  ports,	  protocols	  and	  services.	  Vulnerabilities	  are	  discovered	  by	  
using	  suitable	  vulnerability	  scanners	  or	  tools.	  
	  
Fuzzing	  is	  required	  at	  certain	  security	  levels	  or	  if	  there	  are	  availabil-­‐
ity	  requirements.	  Fuzzing	  means	  discovery	  of	  unknown	  vulnerabili-­‐
ties,	  coding	  errors	  and	  security	  loopholes	  in	  software,	  operating	  sys-­‐
tems	  or	  networks	  within	  the	  system	  by	  inputting	  random	  data	  to	  the	  




Access	  controls	  of	  web	  applications,	  client	  and	  server	  applications	  or	  







Target	  might	  have	  specific	  encryption	  requirements.	  Protocols,	  qual-­‐
ity	  of	  encryption	  keys,	  key	  handling	  procedures	  and	  actual	  realiza-­‐




Availability	  testing	  can	  be	  combined	  with	  fuzzing,	  but	  also	  includes	  





Implementation	  of	  physical	  security	  in	  structures,	  doors,	  windows	  
and	  alarm	  systems	  are	  audited.	  	  
	  






Communication	  between	  different	  information	  systems	  that	  have	  
different	  security	  levels	  might	  have	  to	  be	  tightly	  controlled.	  One	  real	  
life	  example	  of	  implementation	  is	  data	  diode,	  unidirectional	  security	  
gateway.	  Finland	  has	  official	  guide	  for	  security	  gateway	  implementa-­‐







Systems,	  people	  and	  organization	  are	  tested	  for	  capabilities	  and	  
processes	  of	  detecting	  different	  kind	  of	  anomalies	  like	  viruses,	  data	  




If	  required	  TEMPEST	  is	  measured	  against	  emanation	  leaks,	  including	  









The	  tools	  and	  methods	  for	  achieving	  the	  previous	  goals	  are	  not	  specifically	  guided	  
except	  for	  TEMPEST	  where	  guidelines	  exist	  but	  they	  are	  not	  public.	  The	  execution	  
order	  of	  a	  technical	  audit	  depends	  on	  the	  auditor,	  however,	  typically	  the	  administra-­‐
tive	  section	  is	  executed	  first.	  Table	  4	  is	  a	  sample	  list	  of	  commonly	  used	  audit	  tools	  








	   	   	  
	  
14	  
Table	  4	  Commonly	  used	  audit	  tools	  and	  their	  purpose	  
	  
Tool	   Purpose	  
Tcpdump,	  (http://www.tcpdump.org)	  
Wireshark,	  (http://www.wireshark.org)	  
Clarified	  network	  analyzer,	  
(https://www.clarifiednetworks.com/Clarified%20Analyzer	  
Network	  traffic	  analysis	  
and	  network	  topology	  
analysis.	  



















Burp	  Suite,	  www.portswigger.net/burp/	  











Protocol/Data	  testing	  or	  tunneling	  tools	  (Netcat,	  Hping,	  
Scapy,	  Python)	  	  
	  
Implementation	  of	  
network	  security	  like	  
security	  gateways,	  
firewall	  filtering.	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Test	  virus	  EICAR	  ,	  www.eicar.org	  
	  
Official	  antivirus	  and	  
alarm	  testing	  file.	  
Suitable	  Denial	  of	  Service	  (DOS)	  tool	  
Hping,	  Slowloris.pl,	  LOIC	  (Low	  Orbit	  Ion	  Canon)	  and	  variants	  
	  
Availability	  testing	  
and	  deployment	  of	  
network	  and	  applica-­‐
tion	  security.	  






2.5. Audit	  Results	  
	  
Typical	  audit	  results	  consist	  of	  found	  vulnerabilities,	  flaws	  in	  used	  software	  or	  prod-­‐
uct	  or	  overall	  security	  implementation.	  Naturally	  there	  are	  different	  levels	  of	  flaws	  
that	  can	  be	  presented	  from	  low	  to	  critical	  status.	  Some	  results	  are	  simply	  presented	  
as	  pass	  or	  fail	  status	  if	  there	  are	  specific	  requirements	  for	  specific	  security	  controls.	  	  
Administrative	  results	  are	  compared	  to	  technical	  results	  and	  vice	  versa	  to	  see	  if	  they	  
co-­‐operate.	  The	  results	  basically	  explain	  how	  well	  the	  target	  system	  is	  in	  compliance	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3. Basic	  Concept	  of	  Attacks	  
	  
	  
3.1. Why	  Attacks	  Happen	  
	  
There	  are	  many	  reasons	  why	  attacks	  occur.	  The	  reasons	  can	  be	  political,	  hacktivism,	  
terrorism,	  vandalism,	  or	  even	  accidents.	  Some	  of	  the	  stolen	  data	  is	  revealed	  to	  the	  
public	  after	  intrusion,	  however,	  but	  for	  certain	  attackers	  the	  data	  is	  more	  valuable	  
when	  it	  is	  kept	  in	  secret	  and	  the	  attack,	  if	  not	  revealed,	  can	  go	  on.	  Attacks,	  if	  not	  au-­‐





The	  attacker	  tries	  to	  get	  as	  much	  useful	  information	  of	  the	  target	  as	  possible.	  The	  
information	  is	  gathered	  from	  public	  sources	  like	  Internet,	  network	  scanning	  or	  by	  
phishing	  the	  users	  or	  administrators	  or	  even	  by	  dumpster	  diving.	  The	  goal	  of	  recon-­‐
naissance	  is	  to	  gather	  enough	  information	  to	  execute	  the	  next	  phase	  and	  find	  weak	  





Once	  weak	  points	  have	  been	  discovered,	  target	  systems	  or	  computers	  are	  directly	  
exploited	  or	  with	  the	  help	  of	  user	  actions.	  The	  exploit	  could	  be	  delivered	  using	  email,	  
web	  sites	  or	  portable	  media.	  The	  exploitation	  does	  not	  need	  to	  occur	  inside	  the	  tar-­‐
get’s	  network	  but	  when	  users	  are	  using	  a	  public	  network	  or	  are	  out	  of	  the	  physical	  
security	  zone.	  In	  some	  cases	  the	  attacker	  creates	  a	  trust	  relationship	  with	  persons,	  
which	  might	  ease	  the	  task	  of	  exploit	  delivery.	  
	  





The	  attacker	  tries	  to	  gain	  foothold	  on	  the	  target	  system	  and	  remain	  persistent.	  This	  
can	  be	  achieved	  with	  trojans,	  backdoors,	  rootkits,	  or	  APT	  malware.	  	  The	  malware	  
might	  be	  distributed	  to	  only	  a	  few	  target	  computers	  instead	  of	  a	  whole	  network.	  
	  
A	  rootkit	  is	  a	  piece	  of	  software	  that	  enables	  the	  continued,	  privileged	  
access	  to	  a	  computer,	  all	  the	  while	  hiding	  its	  presence	  from	  users	  and	  
administrators.	  Although	  rootkits	  themselves	  might	  not	  be	  dangerous,	  
the	  software	  or	  processes	  they	  hide	  almost	  always	  are.	  Unlike	  a	  virus,	  a	  
rootkit	  gains	  administrative	  privileges	  to	  your	  machine.	  The	  biggest	  is-­‐
sue	  with	  rootkits	  is	  that	  once	  on	  a	  system,	  they	  are	  a	  challenge	  to	  detect	  
and	  remove,	  because	  their	  main	  purpose	  is	  obfuscation.	  (Jack	  Wallen,	  
2010)	  
	  
Malware	  can	  also	  be	  memory	  based	  (Lucian	  Constantin,2012)	  and	  self-­‐destructing	  if	  





An	  attacker	  steals	  and	  uses	  existing	  accounts,	  which	  generates	  less	  noise	  in	  the	  form	  
of	  logs.	  	  The	  attacker	  can	  also	  create	  extra	  accounts	  to	  the	  systems.	  The	  attacker	  can	  
create	  new	  services,	  spread	  backdoor,	  manipulate	  existing	  services	  or	  use	  existing	  
services	  to	  hop	  from	  one	  machine	  to	  another,	  which	  again	  generates	  less	  noise	  at	  the	  
network	  level	  and	  logs.	   	  
	  
	  
3.6. Data	  Infiltration	  
	  
The	  stolen	  data	  is	  transferred	  from	  victim	  computers	  to	  attacker	  systems	  with	  the	  
help	  of	  network	  protocols	  or	  portable	  media.	  Exfiltration	  can	  go	  through	  several	  ma-­‐
chines	  and	  data	  source	  is	  not	  directly	  communicating	  to	  the	  attacker.	  The	  machines	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that	  intercept	  the	  stolen	  data	  are	  somewhere	  on	  the	  Internet	  and	  the	  intruder	  can-­‐
not	  therefore	  be	  easily	  identified.	  Intercepting	  a	  machine	  can	  be	  an	  other	  target	  that	  
has	  been	  taken	  over	  to	  collect	  data	  from	  other	  targets.	  	  
	  
All	  the	  previous	  steps	  could	  be	  carried	  out	  on	  the	  hardware	  level,	  which	  is	  much	  
harder	  to	  detect.	  
	  
	  
Leaked	  NSA	  documents	  have	  revealed	  that	  also	  special	  hardware	  (chip-­‐
sets,	  removable	  storage	  and	  cables	  that	  uses	  wireless	  signaling	  etc.)	  is	  
used	  by	  advanced	  attackers.	  (Sean	  Gallagher,2013)	  
	  
	  
Hardware	  investigation	  requires	  special	  tools	  and	  probably	  a	  laboratory.	  This	  process	  
would	  also	  affect	  on	  availability	  of	  the	  system	  being	  audited.	  This	  thesis	  concentrates	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4. Imperfections	  in	  Audit	  Process	  
	  
	  
Signs	  of	  Hacking	  and	  Audit	  Process	  
	  
In	  the	  light	  of	  public	  and	  closed	  data	  about	  intrusions	  and	  methods	  that	  are	  taught	  in	  
the	  hacking	  courses,	  there	  are	  missing	  actions	  in	  the	  audit	  process.	  All	  items	  in	  the	  
following	  list	  do	  not	  not	  apply	  to	  all	  auditors.	  The	  list	  is	  built	  up	  from	  observation	  of	  
audit	  work	  in	  Finland	  and	  contains	  the	  most	  typical	  flaws.	  Also,	  the	  audited	  target	  
might	  already	  execute	  necessary	  actions	  to	  fulfill	  some	  of	  the	  following	  actions.	  Typi-­‐
cally	  this	  is	  a	  scheduled	  full	  antivirus	  scan.	  
	  
• Full	  antivirus	  checks	  are	  not	  necessarily	  run	  during	  audit	  
• Historical	  data	  (alerts,	  logs)	  are	  not	  reviewed	  
• Systems	  that	  do	  not	  have	  antivirus	  installed	  are	  not	  checked	  for	  viruses	  	  
• Passive	  network	  analysis	  does	  not	  include	  active	  search	  of	  anomalies	  
• Analysis	  of	  the	  data	  captured	  during	  passive	  analysis	  has	  to	  be	  done	  manually	  
• Gathered	  data	  is	  lightly	  analyzed	  not	  actually	  compared	  to	  anything	  
• Integrity	  of	  systems	  is	  required	  but	  typically	  not	  verified	  
• Overall	  capability	  of	  the	  search	  of	  anomalies	  inside	  the	  systems	  is	  missing.	  
There	  is	  knowledge	  and	  information	  about	  anomalies;	  however,	  it	  is	  not	  fully	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5. Legal	  Matters	  
	  
	  
5.1. Finnish	  Privacy	  Law	  
	  
Finland	  has	  it	  is	  own	  privacy	  law	  called	  Act	  on	  the	  Protection	  of	  Privacy	  in	  Electronic	  
Communications.	  The	  objective	  of	  the	  Act	  is	  to	  ensure	  confidentiality	  and	  protection	  
of	  privacy	  in	  electronic	  communications	  and	  to	  promote	  information	  security	  in	  elec-­‐
tronic	  communications	  and	  the	  balanced	  development	  of	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  electronic	  
communications	  services.	  (Act	  on	  the	  Protection	  of	  Privacy	  in	  Electronic	  Communica-­‐
tions)	  
The	  act	  limits	  the	  possibility	  and	  ways	  to	  monitor	  network	  traffic	  and	  user	  actions	  
where	  data	  is	  private.	  However,	  Section	  20	  (125/2009)	  of	  the	  act	  gives	  some	  rights	  to	  
undertake	  necessary	  measures	  to	  ensure	  information	  security	  during	  an	  audit.	  Sec-­‐
tion	  20	  of	  the	  Act	  is	  quoted	  here	  in	  full.	  
	  
Section	  20	  (125/2009)	  -­‐	  Measures	  taken	  to	  implement	  information	  secu-­‐
rity	  
	  
(1)	  A	  telecommunications	  operator,	  value	  added	  service	  provider	  or	  cor-­‐
porate	  or	  association	  subscriber,	  or	  any	  party	  acting	  on	  their	  behalf	  has	  
the	  right	  to	  undertake	  necessary	  measures	  referred	  to	  in	  section	  2	  for	  
ensuring	  information	  security:	  	  
	  
1)	  in	  order	  to	  detect,	  prevent,	  investigate	  and	  commit	  to	  
pre-­‐trial	  Investigation	  any	  disruptions	  in	  information	  secu-­‐
rity	  of	  communications	  networks	  or	  related	  services;	  	  
2)	  in	  order	  to	  safeguard	  the	  communications	  ability	  of	  the	  
sender	  or	  the	  recipient	  of	  the	  message;	  or	  	  
3)	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  preparations	  of	  means	  of	  payment	  
fraud	  referred	  to	  in	  Chapter	  37(11)	  of	  the	  Penal	  Code	  
planned	  to	  be	  implemented	  on	  a	  wide	  scale	  via	  communi-­‐
cation	  services.	  	  
	  
(2)	  Measures	  referred	  to	  in	  subsection	  1	  above	  may	  include:	  	  
	  
1)	  automatic	  analysis	  of	  message	  content;	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2)	  automatic	  prevention	  or	  limitation	  of	  message	  convey-­‐
ance	  or	  reception;	  	  
3)	  automatic	  removal	  from	  messages	  of	  malicious	  soft-­‐
ware	  that	  pose	  a	  threat	  to	  information	  security;	  	  
4)	  any	  other	  comparable	  technical	  measures.	  	  
	  
(3)	  If	  it	  is	  evident	  due	  to	  the	  message	  type,	  form	  or	  some	  other	  similar	  
reason	  that	  the	  message	  contains	  a	  malicious	  software	  or	  command,	  
and	  automatic	  content	  analysis	  of	  the	  message	  cannot	  ensure	  the	  at-­‐
tainment	  of	  the	  goals	  referred	  to	  in	  subsection	  1,	  the	  contents	  of	  a	  sin-­‐
gle	  message	  may	  be	  processed	  manually.	  The	  sender	  and	  recipient	  of	  a	  
message	  whose	  contents	  have	  been	  manually	  processed	  shall	  be	  in-­‐
formed	  of	  the	  processing,	  unless	  the	  information	  would	  apparently	  en-­‐
danger	  the	  attainment	  of	  the	  goals	  referred	  to	  in	  subsection	  1.	  	  
	  
(4)	  Any	  measures	  referred	  to	  in	  this	  section	  shall	  be	  implemented	  with	  
care,	  and	  they	  shall	  be	  commensurate	  with	  the	  seriousness	  of	  the	  dis-­‐
ruption	  being	  combated.	  Such	  measures	  shall	  not	  limit	  freedom	  of	  
speech,	  the	  confidentiality	  of	  a	  message	  or	  the	  protection	  of	  privacy	  any	  
more	  than	  is	  necessary	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  safeguarding	  the	  goals	  re-­‐
ferred	  to	  in	  subsection	  1.	  Such	  measures	  shall	  be	  discontinued	  if	  the	  
conditions	  for	  them	  specified	  in	  this	  section	  no	  longer	  exist.	  	  
	  
(5)	  The	  Finnish	  Communications	  Regulatory	  Authority	  may	  issue	  further	  
regulations	  to	  telecommunications	  operators	  and	  value	  added	  service	  
providers	  on	  the	  technical	  implementation	  of	  the	  measures	  referred	  to	  
in	  this	  section.	  
 
The	  law	  justifies	  an	  automatic	  analysis	  of	  data.	  Manual	  analysis	  is	  possible	  if	  auto-­‐
matic	  content	  analysis	  fails	  to	  reach	  it	  is	  goal.	  A	  good	  example	  of	  this	  is	  communica-­‐
tion	  protocol	  that	  is	  not	  recognized	  automatically,	  but	  does	  something	  abnormal.	  
	  
	  
5.2. Private	  Data	  and	  Audit	  
	  
Private	  data	  could	  be	  gathered	  in	  several	  ways.	  Passive	  network	  monitoring,	  which	  
may	  reveal	  Internet	  browsing	  or	  emails	  is	  one	  way.	  An	  audit	  of	  the	  workstation	  or	  
server	  can	  reveal	  personal	  files	  or	  Internet	  history.	  Even	  with	  the	  given	  rights	  of	  the	  
Act,	  privacy	  has	  to	  be	  respected	  and	  only	  necessary	  actions	  can	  be	  taken	  during	  ex-­‐
amination.	  There	  are	  basically	  two	  kinds	  of	  audit	  variations	  and	  in	  these	  cases	  the	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approach	  to	  the	  audit	  has	  to	  be	  distinct.	  The	  first	  case	  is	  where	  target	  being	  audited	  
only	  has	  system	  owner’s	  data.	  	  With	  the	  system	  owner’s	  permission	  the	  system	  can	  
be	  thoroughly	  audited.	  
	  
The	  second	  case	  is	  where	  there	  is	  a	  possibility	  that	  a	  target	  has	  private	  files,	  private	  
Internet	  history	  or	  private	  network	  traffic.	  In	  that	  case	  permission	  to	  a	  thorough	  au-­‐
dit	  has	  to	  come	  from	  a	  user	  or	  users	  of	  the	  system.	  If	  there	  is	  no	  permission,	  normal	  
audit	  process	  applies	  and	  following	  steps	  should	  be	  taken:	  
 
• No	  personal	  file	  checks,	  except	  general	  activities	  like	  virus	  scanning	  
• Only	  general	  file	  searches	  like	  virus.exe.	  	  
• No	  searching	  traces	  that	  could	  reveal	  personal	  activities.	  These	  in-­‐
clude	  browsing	  history,	  typed	  URL’s,	  last	  opened	  files	  etc.	  
• Traffic	  analysis	  has	  to	  be	  carried	  out	  as	  automatically	  as	  possible	  
and	  if	  personal	  data	  is	  revealed	  and	  the	  user	  is	  identified,	  he	  or	  she	  
has	  to	  be	  notified.	  
• Found	  network	  addresses	  or	  DNS	  names	  that	  can	  be	  treated	  as	  a	  
conversation	  partner	  in	  private	  communication,	  have	  to	  be	  handled	  
in	  a	  way	  that	  they	  cannot	  be	  connected	  to	  any	  specific	  user.	  
	  
	  
5.3. Responsibilities	  and	  Limitations	  
	  
If	  an	  audit	  reveals	  system	  breaches	  or	  other	  anomalies,	  the	  auditor	  is	  only	  allowed	  to	  
notify	  system	  owner.	  	  In	  Finland,	  it	  is	  the	  system	  owner’s	  responsibility	  to	  inform	  the	  
police	  about	  data	  breach	  and	  the	  police	  are	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  investigation.	  Even	  In	  
case	  of	  detection	  of	  things	  like	  child	  pornography,	  when	  data	  is	  in	  a	  personal	  com-­‐
puter	  or	  in	  a	  personal	  folder,	  the	  auditor	  is	  not	  necessarily	  allowed	  to	  inform	  anyone	  
due	  to	  privacy	  law.	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Usually	  time	  and	  resources	  for	  the	  audit	  are	  limited.	  Tools	  being	  used	  have	  to	  be	  
proven	  to	  work	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  have	  to	  be	  first	  inspected	  by	  the	  target	  organiza-­‐
tion.	  That	  means	  that	  tools	  and	  methods	  have	  to	  be	  not	  only	  readable,	  but	  also	  
quickly	  customizable	  by	  the	  auditor.	  Audit	  tools	  are	  also	  not	  supposed	  to	  make	  any	  
changes	  to	  the	  target	  system.	  	  Therefore	  special	  antivirus	  or	  integrity	  checks	  have	  to	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6. Adding	  Anomaly-­‐finding	  Capability	  to	  Audit	  Process	  
	  
	  
6.1. Anomaly	  Finding	  Capability	  
	  
If	  normal	  audit	  is	  executed	  mostly	  only	  static	  checks	  are	  made,	  and	  some	  basic	  his-­‐
torical	  data	  is	  investigated.	  If	  one	  also	  wants	  to	  search	  anomalies	  or	  to	  see	  that	  a	  
system	  has	  been	  used	  and	  maintained	  as	  agreed,	  extra	  analysis	  has	  to	  be	  made.	  	  
Signs	  can	  be	  found	  from	  the	  system	  itself	  (files,	  registry,	  configuration),	  log	  analysis	  
or	  current	  state	  of	  network.	  	  Signs	  to	  look	  for	  come	  from	  the	  known	  intrusion	  meth-­‐
ods	  or	  known	  tricks	  that	  are	  used	  to	  deceive	  administrators	  or	  users.	  	  
	  
Ideas	  to	  anomaly	  detection	  can	  be	  adopted	  from	  forensics	  and	  malware	  analysis	  
methods	  and	  from	  learned	  hacking	  methods.	  The	  difference	  between	  auditing	  and	  
forensics	  is	  that	  during	  audit	  one	  does	  not	  actively	  search	  for	  evidence	  and	  try	  to	  
maintain	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  evidence	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  
	  
	  
6.2. Computer	  Forensics	  
	  
During	  computer	  forensics,	  systems	  are	  searched	  for	  intrusion	  evidence	  and	  investi-­‐
gators	  try	  also	  to	  build	  a	  timeline	  of	  the	  intrusion.	  Disk	  imaging	  and	  memory	  dumps	  
are	  used	  to	  maintain	  integrity	  of	  the	  original	  data.	  Data	  is	  then	  searched	  in	  offline	  
environment.	  Table	  5	  presents	  definitions	  used	  by	  U.S.	  Federal	  Bureau	  of	  Investiga-­‐
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Table	  5	  Aspects	  of	  computer	  forensic	  science	  	  
	  
Evidence	  source	   Explanation	  
Data	  objects	   Objects	  or	  information	  of	  potential	  probative	  value	  
that	  are	  associated	  with	  physical	  items.	  Data	  objects	  
may	  occur	  in	  different	  file	  formats	  (for	  example,	  
NTFS	  or	  FAT32)	  without	  alteration	  of	  the	  original	  
information.	  
Digital	  evidence	   Information	  of	  probative	  value	  that	  is	  stored	  or	  
transmitted	  in	  digital	  form.	  
Physical	  items	   Items	  on	  which	  data	  objects	  or	  information	  may	  be	  




Physical	  items	  and	  the	  data	  objects	  associated	  with	  
such	  items	  at	  the	  time	  of	  acquisition	  or	  seizure.	  
Duplicate	  digital	  evidence.	  An	  accurate	  digital	  re-­‐
production	  of	  all	  data	  objects	  contained	  on	  an	  origi-­‐
nal	  physical	  item.	  
Duplicate	  digital	  evidence.	  
	  
An	  accurate	  digital	  reproduction	  of	  all	  data	  ob-­‐




Incident	  Response:	  Computer	  Forensics	  Toolkit	  	  
Chapter:	  Catching	  the	  Criminal:	  The	  Basics	  of	  Computer	  Forensics	  
	  
Despite	  of	  duplication	  of	  data	  the	  same	  methods	  are	  used	  in	  the	  Finnish	  audit.	  	  Du-­‐
plication	  during	  audit	  would	  mean	  that	  also	  similar	  hardware	  is	  required	  to	  run	  the	  
machines,	  and	  that	  is	  often	  not	  possible.	  However,	  virtualization	  allows	  the	  auditor	  








	   	   	  
	  
26	  
6.3. Malware	  Analysis	  
	  
	  
Approach	  to	  Malware	  Analysis	  
	  
There	  are	  two	  fundamental	  approaches	  to	  malware	  analysis:	  static	  and	  dynamic.	  
Static	  analysis	  involves	  examining	  the	  malware	  without	  running	  it.	  Dynamic	  analysis	  
involves	  running	  the	  malware.	  Both	  techniques	  are	  further	  categorized	  as	  basic	  or	  
advanced.	  (Practical	  malware	  analysis).	  
	  
Basic	  static	  analysis	  consists	  of	  examining	  the	  executable	  file	  without	  viewing	  the	  
actual	  instructions	  (Practical	  malware	  analysis).	  Advanced	  static	  analysis	  consists	  of	  
reverse-­‐engineering	  the	  malware’s	  internals	  by	  loading	  the	  executable	  into	  a	  disas-­‐
sembler	  and	  looking	  at	  the	  program	  instructions	  in	  order	  to	  discover	  what	  the	  pro-­‐
gram	  does	  (Practical	  malware	  analysis).	  
	  
Basic	  dynamic	  analysis	  techniques	  involve	  running	  the	  malware	  and	  observing	  its	  
behavior	  on	  the	  system	  in	  order	  to	  remove	  the	  infection,	  produce	  effective	  signa-­‐
tures,	  or	  both	  (Practical	  malware	  analysis).	  	  Advanced	  dynamic	  analysis	  uses	  a	  de-­‐
bugger	  to	  examine	  the	  internal	  state	  of	  a	  running	  malicious	  executable	  (Practical	  
malware	  analysis).	  
	  
Memory	  analysis	  and	  disk	  imaging	  are	  problematic	  due	  to	  today’s	  technical	  devel-­‐
opment	  like	  the	  amount	  of	  used	  memory,	  Address	  Space	  Layout	  Randomization	  or	  
implementation	  of	  disk	  redundancy.	  Additionally,	  most	  times	  the	  auditing	  is	  execut-­‐
ed	  on	  live	  production	  environment.	  Therefore	  during	  an	  audit	  it	  is	  better	  to	  carry	  out	  
similar	  checks	  as	  in	  computer	  forensics	  and	  look	  for	  signs	  of	  abnormal	  behavior	  in	  
the	  past.	  Malware	  behavior	  could	  be	  detected	  from	  system	  logs	  or	  from	  passive	  
monitoring	  of	  the	  network.	  Malware	  analysis	  goes	  to	  very	  basic	  level:	  Are	  there	  extra	  
processes	  and	  do	  they	  communicate	  with	  other	  machines?	  The	  malware	  can	  also	  
destroy	  itself	  automatically	  if	  it	  detects	  examination	  even	  if	  it	  is	  not	  memory	  based.	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From	  auditing	  perspective	  anomaly	  detection	  can	  be	  divided	  into	  three	  categories:	  
	  
	  
Bad	  System	  Usage	  or	  Maintenance	  
	  
Login	  methods	  reveal	  used	  protocols,	  login	  sources	  and	  used	  account	  details.	  This	  
data	  can	  be	  combined	  with	  login	  times	  and	  dates.	  Activity	  in	  strange	  times	  or	  exces-­‐
sive	  use	  of	  administrative	  or	  strange	  accounts	  should	  be	  investigated.	  
	  
USB	  device	  history	  reveals	  if	  data	  has	  been	  copied	  from	  the	  system	  or	  to	  system	  with	  
approved	  portable	  media.	  Device	  history	  usually	  reveals	  if	  there	  have	  been	  unknown	  
devices	  connected	  to	  the	  system.	  
	  
Network	  connection	  history	  can	  be	  analyzed	  with	  passive	  monitoring	  and	  reviewing	  
logs	  from	  firewall	  or	  proxy.	  DNS	  records	  are	  valuable	  if	  they	  have	  been	  saved	  since	  a	  
connection	  attempt	  does	  not	  necessarily	  happen	  before	  resolving	  of	  the	  domain	  or	  
hostname.	  The	  devices	  connected	  to	  the	  network	  can	  be	  traced	  with	  passive	  moni-­‐
toring,	  DHCP	  logs	  and	  scanning	  MAC	  addresses	  in	  the	  network.	  MAC	  addresses	  can	  
be	  counted	  and	  mapped	  to	  vendor	  lists.	  
	  
Installed	  updates	  and	  their	  install	  dates	  report	  if	  a	  system	  has	  been	  updated	  or	  main-­‐
tained	  as	  described.	  If	  the	  system	  has	  not	  been	  updated	  in	  a	  long	  time,	  the	  risk	  of	  
intrusion	  rises.	  Virus	  and	  malware	  detection	  and	  update	  history	  reveal	  if	  the	  organi-­‐
zation	  and	  employees	  have	  reacted	  to	  virus	  alerts.	  	  	  
	  
Anomalies	  could	  be	  detected	  by	  searching	  specific	  changes	  to	  the	  system	  or	  by	  ana-­‐
lyzing	  the	  system’s	  history	  (logs),	  user	  or	  network	  traffic	  behavior.	  The	  checklist	  of	  
specific	  changes	  builds	  up	  from	  the	  files	  or	  settings	  that	  the	  auditor	  or	  the	  public	  
knows	  and	  that	  can	  be	  changed	  or	  added	  to	  the	  system	  so	  that	  the	  system	  becomes	  
insecure.	  Keeping	  the	  list	  updated	  requires	  gathering	  data	  about	  new	  methods	  all	  the	  
time.	  Material	  can	  be	  gathered	  from	  forensics	  courses	  and	  by	  following	  hacking	  sites.	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Abnormal	  System	  Changes	  
	  
Abnormal	  system	  changes	  mean	  settings	  or	  changes	  that	  should	  not	  exist	  within	  the	  
system.	  In	  Windows,	  registry	  is	  the	  place	  where	  most	  of	  the	  operating	  system	  level	  
changes	  occur.	  Linux	  configuration	  is	  mostly	  file	  based	  and	  therefore	  the	  approach	  to	  
that	  operating	  system	  has	  to	  be	  different.	  Both	  systems	  have	  systems	  files	  that	  can	  
be	  modified	  or	  replaced.	  Missing	  logs	  or	  extra	  files	  within	  the	  system	  should	  also	  be	  
investigated.	  
	  
Extra	  user	  accounts	  can	  exist	  in	  almost	  every	  system.	  The	  location	  of	  the	  account	  
however	  is	  not	  necessarily	  local	  Active	  directory,	  AD	  or	  extra	  user	  account	  can	  be	  
added	  to	  local	  accounts	  so	  that	  it	  is	  not	  necessarily	  detected	  from	  central	  manage-­‐
ment.	  
	  	  
Network	  analysis	  can	  reveal	  protocol	  misuses	  like	  binding	  services	  to	  strange	  ports	  or	  
data	  tunneling.	  Binding	  services	  to	  uncommon	  ports	  is	  not	  wrong	  or	  uncommon;	  
however,	  most	  of	  the	  protection	  systems	  like	  firewall	  tend	  to	  inspect	  protocols	  incor-­‐
rectly	  when	  their	  behavior	  has	  been	  modified.	  
	  
	  
Behavioral	  Analysis	  	  
	  
Behavioral	  analysis	  needs	  both	  special	  security	  knowledge	  and	  help	  from	  the	  system	  
administrator	  who	  hopefully	  knows	  the	  system’s	  normal	  state.	  Data	  might	  have	  to	  be	  
compared	  to	  something	  like	  a	  list	  of	  bad	  Internet	  Protocol,	  IP	  addresses,	  file	  signa-­‐
tures	  or	  knowledge	  of	  the	  administrator	  before	  the	  decision	  of	  further	  action	  is	  
made.	  The	  analysis	  can	  be	  automatic	  or	  manual	  depending	  on	  how	  the	  data	  is	  gath-­‐
ered.	  
	  
Usage	  of	  existing	  user	  accounts,	  details	  of	  installed	  device	  drivers,	  list	  of	  system	  ser-­‐
vices	  or	  analysis	  system	  and	  application	  errors	  can	  be	  more	  easily	  analyzed	  with	  the	  
help	  of	  a	  knowledgeable	  system	  admin.	  Other	  points	  of	  interests	  are	  analysis	  of	  in-­‐
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stalled	  software,	  overall	  analysis	  of	  network	  traffic	  and	  protocols,	  connection	  at-­‐
tempts	  to	  various	  domains	  or	  Internet	  Protocol	  addresses	  and	  strange	  activity	  time	  
periods	  of	  users	  and	  the	  system.	  Collected	  results	  can	  and	  should	  be	  compared	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Common	  requirements	  for	  audit	  tools	  are	  that	  they	  are	  reliable,	  portable	  and	  can	  be	  
modified.	  Target	  operating	  system	  also	  sets	  limitations	  since	  not	  all	  programming	  
languages	  are	  directly	  supported.	  Therefore	  tools	  or	  scripting	  languages	  that	  are	  






Microsoft	  Powershell	  scripting	  tool	  is	  supported	  by	  all	  modern	  Microsoft	  operating	  
systems.	  Powershell	  is	  also	  easily	  modifiable,	  understandable	  and	  can	  be	  easily	  
checked	  by	  target	  organizations	  since	  it	  is	  becoming	  the	  de-­‐facto	  tool	  for	  mainte-­‐
nance.	  In	  addition,	  Powershell	  can	  also	  execute	  or	  call	  external	  commands	  and	  it	  is	  
not	  that	  way	  limited	  to	  its	  own	  command-­‐lets.	  Windows	  PowerShell	  is	  Microsoft's	  
task-­‐based	  command-­‐line	  shell	  and	  scripting	  language	  used	  as	  configuration	  man-­‐
agement	  framework.	  Powershell	  is	  built	  on	  .NET	  Framework.	  	  (Technet,	  2014)	  
	  
Caveats	  of	  Powershell	  is	  versioning	  and	  dependence	  in	  modules	  if	  extra	  checks	  for	  
specific	  services	  have	  to	  be	  made.	  That	  might	  require	  modules	  that	  are	  not	  necessari-­‐
ly	  installed.	  Since	  one	  cannot	  predict	  what	  modules	  are	  installed	  on	  the	  target,	  com-­‐
mon	  commands	  or	  command-­‐lets	  have	  to	  be	  used.	  Powershell	  can	  also	  export	  and	  
convert	  collected	  data	  to	  different	  formats	  for	  reporting	  purposes.	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7.2. Linux	  Audit	  Tool	  
  
Building	  Linux	  tools	  is	  harder	  because	  every	  Linux	  distribution	  and	  installation	  can	  
have	  different	  package	  managers,	  shell	  environments	  and	  available	  commands.	  	  Also,	  
software	  versions	  or	  directory	  structure	  and	  location	  of	  system	  files	  may	  differ.	  
Therefore,	  basically	  Linux	  has	  to	  be	  audited	  with	  shell	  commands	  and	  differently	  de-­‐
pending	  on	  the	  distribution.	  
	  
Statistically	  Linux	  has	  much	  less	  malware	  and	  is	  not	  that	  often	  used	  for	  workstation	  
purpose	  (except	  homes).	  Linux/Unix	  systems	  are	  typically	  used	  as	  servers,	  which	  
means	  that	  a	  more	  probable	  incident	  against	  them	  is	  data	  theft.	  
	  
	  
7.3. Passive	  Network	  Analysis	  Tool	  
 
In	  Finland	  official	  audit	  process	  already	  includes	  passive	  network	  analysis	  and	  it	  can	  
be	  carried	  out	  with	  live	  capture	  and	  analysis	  on	  the	  fly	  or	  by	  saving	  data	  to	  hard-­‐drive	  
that	  can	  then	  be	  analyzed	  later.	  After	  the	  empirical	  research	  phase	  following	  re-­‐
quirements	  were	  found.	  
	  
The	  tool	  should	  be	  able	  to	  read	  and	  analyze	  large	  packet	  capture	  files	  and	  also	  be	  
able	  to	  do	  an	  online	  analysis	  on	  the	  fly.	  The	  tool	  should	  recognize	  and	  support	  as	  
many	  protocols	  as	  possible,	  and	  manual	  protocol	  mapping	  should	  be	  possible.	  Filter-­‐
ing	  of	  data	  should	  also	  be	  possible	  by	  keyword	  or	  by	  source	  or	  destination	  IP	  address	  
and	  the	  results	  should	  be	  possible	  to	  be	  directed	  to	  another	  file	  for	  further	  analysis.	  
The	  auditor	  should	  also	  be	  able	  to	  filter	  traffic	  in	  a	  way	  that	  privacy	  is	  respected	  
when	  required.	  The	  tool	  should	  be	  portable	  in	  a	  way	  that	  analysis	  can	  be	  carried	  out	  
by	  using	  the	  target’s	  own	  workstation	  or	  server.	  If	  the	  traffic	  is	  encrypted,	  the	  tool	  
should	  be	  able	  to	  report	  certificates	  and	  encryption	  handshake	  options.	  
	  
	  





TShark	  is	  a	  network	  protocol	  analyzer	  related	  to	  Wireshark.	  Both	  tools	  can	  achieve	  
the	  same	  results.	  The	  difference	  is	  that	  Tshark	  is	  command	  line	  based	  and	  can	  be	  
automated	  to	  process	  large	  amounts	  of	  files	  and	  data.	  Packets	  can	  be	  captured	  from	  
live	  network	  and	  analyzed	  on-­‐the-­‐fly	  or	  read	  from	  previously	  saved	  capture	  files.	  
TShark's	  native	  capture	  file	  format	  is	  libpcap	  format,	  which	  is	  also	  the	  format	  used	  
by	  Tcpdump	  and	  various	  other	  tools.	  (Tshark	  manual,	  wireshark.org).	  Libpcap	  is	  an	  
Application	  interface	  to	  low-­‐level	  network	  traffic	  monitoring.	  Read	  filters	  in	  TShark	  
also	  allow	  selection	  of	  packets	  to	  be	  decoded	  and	  written	  to	  another	  file	  (Clint	  P.	  





Ssldump	  can	  handle	  traffic	  encrypted	  with	  Secure	  Sockets	  Layer	  or	  Transport	  Layer	  
Security	  protocols.	  It	  can	  automatically	  identify	  SSL	  or	  TLS	  connections	  and	  decodes	  
the	  records	  and	  displays	  them	  in	  a	  textual	  form.	  If	  provided	  with	  the	  appropriate	  
keying	  material,	  it	  will	  also	  decrypt	  the	  connections	  and	  display	  the	  application	  data	  
traffic.	  (Ssldump	  manual,	  rtfm.com)	  
Ssldump	  can	  decrypt	  the	  connections	  with	  appropriate	  keying	  material,	  but	  that	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8. Windows	  Anomalies	  
	  
	  
8.1. Windows	  Protection	  	  
	  
Windows	  is	  known	  to	  have	  lot	  of	  malware	  dedicated	  to	  it.	  Even	  though	  Microsoft	  has	  
developed	  ways	  to	  protect	  applications	  from	  attackers	  (Data	  Execution	  Prevention,	  
Address	  Space	  Layout	  Randomization,	  Enhanced	  Mitigation	  Experience	  Toolkit)	  or	  
user	  actions,	  it	  is	  not	  perfect.	  Many	  changes	  can	  be	  made	  to	  alter	  the	  operating	  sys-­‐
tem	  to	  hide	  intruder’s	  tracks;	  however,	  if	  an	  intruder	  can	  stay	  in	  the	  system	  for	  many	  
years	  it	  means	  that	  nobody	  is	  actually	  watching	  logs	  or	  monitoring	  abnormal	  behav-­‐
ior.	  This	  is	  understandable	  when	  the	  amount	  of	  systems	  is	  high	  and	  the	  number	  of	  
employees	  is	  low.	  
	  
	  
8.2. Anomalies	  from	  Windows	  Logs	  
	  
By	  default	  Windows	  stores	  login	  information	  in	  its	  log	  files.	  Security	  policy	  has	  to	  be	  
specifically	  set	  so	  that	  both	  successful	  and	  unsuccessful	  logins	  are	  logged	  to	  the	  secu-­‐
rity	  log.	  Event	  ID	  and	  the	  method	  of	  parsing	  the	  event	  depend	  on	  whether	  local	  or	  
AD	  login	  is	  used.	  Also	  alternate	  authentication	  methods,	  like	  smartcard,	  go	  to	  differ-­‐
ent	  Event	  ID.	  Data	  that	  can	  be	  collected	  from	  events	  are	  user	  names,	  login	  time,	  lo-­‐
gon	  type,	  source	  IP	  address,	  hostname	  etc.	  However	  this	  requires	  parsing	  the	  con-­‐
tents	  of	  the	  actual	  events	  and	  knowledge	  of	  the	  environment.	  This	  information	  is	  
valuable	  when	  audited	  target	  is	  for	  example	  company	  network	  with	  lot	  of	  machines.	  	  	  
	  
Information	  required	  for	  parsing	  the	  logs	  depends	  on	  the	  Event	  ID	  and	  the	  inspected	  
log	  file.	  For	  example,	  the	  security	  log	  contains	  information	  about	  login	  type,	  which	  is	  
expressed	  as	  a	  number	  value	  instead	  of	  words.	  This	  number	  can	  be	  mapped	  to	  an	  
actual	  method	  so	  the	  result	  is	  easier	  to	  evaluate.	  Event	  logs	  contain	  also	  other	  de-­‐
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tailed	  information	  (login	  name,	  time,	  login	  method	  as	  presented	  in	  Table	  6	  etc.)	  of	  
the	  event	  and	  these	  details	  are	  listed	  as	  rows	  inside	  the	  actual	  event	  with	  every	  row	  
presenting	  it	  is	  own	  detail	  value.	  Rows	  are	  numbered	  beginning	  from	  zero.	  In	  the	  
example	  Powershell	  code	  “ReplacementStrings(value)”	  defines	  the	  offset	  from	  the	  
beginning	  and	  the	  value	  is	  then	  given	  a	  human	  interpretable	  name.	  Negative	  value	  (-­‐
1)	  means	  countdown	  beginning	  from	  the	  last	  row.	  
	  
An	  example	  of	  detailed	  event	  data	  from	  a	  failed	  login:  
   
    <EventData> 
    <Data Name="SubjectUserSid">S-1-5-18</Data> 
    <Data Name="SubjectUserName">2012DC$</Data> 
    <Data Name="SubjectDomainName">VALHALLA</Data> 
    <Data Name="SubjectLogonId">0x3e7</Data> 
    <Data Name="TargetUserSid">S-1-0-0</Data> 
    <Data Name="TargetUserName">administrator</Data> 
    <Data Name="TargetDomainName">VALHALLA</Data> 
    <Data Name="Status">0xc000006d</Data> 
    <Data Name="FailureReason">%%2313</Data> 
    <Data Name="SubStatus">0xc000006a</Data> 
    <Data Name="LogonType">2</Data> 
    <Data Name="LogonProcessName">User32 </Data> 
    <Data 
Name="AuthenticationPackageName">Negotiate</Data> 
    <Data Name="WorkstationName">2012DC</Data> 
    <Data Name="TransmittedServices">-</Data> 
    <Data Name="LmPackageName">-</Data> 
    <Data Name="KeyLength">0</Data> 
    <Data Name="ProcessId">0xec4</Data> 
    <Data 
Name="ProcessName">C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe</Data
> 
    <Data Name="IPAddress">127.0.0.1</Data> 
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    <Data Name="IPPort">0</Data> 




Table	  6	  List	  of	  actual	  login	  methods	  	  
 





Translation	   Explanation	  
2	   Interactive	   A user logged on to this computer. 
	  
3	   Network	   A user or computer logged on to this 
computer from the network.	  
4	   Batch	   Batch logontype is used by batch serv-
ers, where processes may be executing 
on behalf of a user without their direct 
intervention.	  
5	   Service	   A service was started by the Service 
Control Manager.	  
7	   Unlock	   This workstation was unlocked.	  
8	   NetworkCleartext	   A user logged on to this computer from 
the network. The user's password was 
passed to the authentication package in 
its unhashed form. The built-in authenti-
cation packages all hash credentials be-
fore sending them across the network. 
The credentials do not traverse the net-
work in plaintext (also called cleartext).	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9	   NewCredentials	   A caller cloned its current token and 
specified new credentials for outbound 
connections. The new logon session has 
the same local identity, but uses different 
credentials for other network connec-
tions.	  
10	   RemoteInteractive	   A user logged on to this computer re-
motely using Terminal Services or Re-
mote Desktop.	  
11	   CachedInteractive	   A user logged on to this computer with 
network credentials that were stored lo-
cally on the computer. The domain con-








 function LogonTypesAndNames { 
  Param($LogonTypeNumber) 
  switch ($LogonTypeNumber) { 
  0 {"System"; break;} 
  2 {"Interactive"; break;} 
  3 {"Network"; break;} 
  … 
… 
… 
  13 {"CachedUnlock"; break;} 
  default {"Unknown"; break;} 
  } 
  } 
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In	  the	  function	  the	  value	  of	  parameter	  LogonTypeNumber	  is	  matched	  to	  the	  name	  
of	  the	  Logon	  type.	  
	  
	  
8.3. Different	  Logins	  from	  Security	  Log	  
 
When	  investigating	  Windows	  logs	  both	  successful	  and	  unsuccessful	  logins	  from	  local	  
system	  and	  AD	  should	  be	  reviewed.	  The	  usage	  of	  administrative	  accounts	  is	  especial-­‐
ly	  interesting.	  Other	  logins	  (successful	  or	  failed)	  that	  can	  be	  parsed	  with	  the	  same	  
method	  by	  changing	  the	  queried	  event	  id	  (Description	  of	  security	  events,	  sup-­‐
port.microsoft.com)	  can	  be	  reported	  similarly,	  but	  possibly	  with	  different	  offsets	  as	  
in	  example.	  
	  
Event	  ID	  that	  means	  successful	  login.	  
Event	  ID:	  4624	  
	  
Event	  ID	  that	  means	  unsuccessful	  login.	  
Event	  ID:	  4776	  
Following	  is	  an	  example	  output	  of	  one	  login	  event	  that	  was	  done	  locally.	  The	  results	  
were	  directed	  to	  a	  format	  separated	  by	  a	  comma.	  This	  example	  also	  includes	  the	  






If	  a	  list	  of	  the	  above	  kind	  of	  events	  is	  opened	  in	  spreadsheet	  program	  like	  Excel,	  data	  	  
can	  	  then	  be	  filtered	  according	  to	  the	  used	  account	  name	  or	  source	  IP	  address	  or	  
something	  else.	  Information,	  however,	  is	  not	  accurate	  in	  the	  means	  of	  used	  login	  
account	  being	  used	  and	  used	  Event	  ID.	  A	  live	  test	  showed	  that	  non-­‐AD	  computer	  that	  
used	  exchange	  mail	  account	  (AD	  account)	  appeared	  in	  the	  AD	  servers	  local	  authenti-­‐
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cation	  log.	  The	  point	  is	  not,	  however,	  where	  the	  log	  can	  be	  found	  but	  what	  can	  be	  
found,	  since	  the	  information	  included	  username,	  hostname,	  IP	  address	  and	  




Logins	  Without	  Security	  Log	  
	  
In	  case	  security	  policy	  is	  not	  set,	  successful	  logins	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  system	  log	  with	  
event	  ID	  7001.	  However,	  the	  system	  log	  gathers	  plenty	  of	  other	  events	  thus	  the	  
available	  login	  history	  might	  not	  be	  long	  and	  it	  seems	  that	  only	  successful	  logins	  are	  
logged.	  
 
$UserProperty = @{n="User";e={(New-Object Sys-
tem.Security.PrincIpal.SecurityIdentifier 
$_.ReplacementStrings[1]).Translate([System.Security.Prin
cIpal.NTAccount])}} $TypeProperty = 
@{n="Action";e={if($_.EventID -eq 7001) {"Logon"} else 
{"Logoff"}}} 
$SourceProperty = @{n="Source";e={$_.Source}} 
$MachineProperty = @{n="Machine";e={$_.MachineName}} 
 
Get-EventLog System -Source Microsoft-Windows-Winlogon -




In	  the	  code	  the	  values	  from	  log	  files	  are	  mapped	  to	  according	  properties.	  These	  
properties	  are	  then	  used	  to	  filter	  data	  for	  the	  output.	  The	  output	  differentiates	  logon	  
and	  logoff	  events.	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8.4. Errors	  from	  System	  and	  Application	  Log	  
	  
Errors	  from	  system	  and	  application	  logs	  indicate	  system	  or	  software	  instability,	  which	  
can	  be	  a	  sign	  of	  normal	  badly	  made	  software,	  however,	  also	  a	  sign	  of	  malware.	  Errors	  
can	  also	  reveal	  misconfigurations	  inside	  the	  system	  that	  might	  mean	  that	  security	  





Get-evenlog	  cmd-­‐let	  is	  told	  to	  fetch	  error	  type	  messages	  from	  application	  log.	  
The	  application	  log	  contains	  information	  about	  application	  startup	  procedures	  and	  
their	  behavior.	  
	  
Get-Eventlog application | where { $_.EntryType -eq 'Er-
ror' } | select time,source,message 
	  






Get-­‐evenlog	  cmd-­‐let	  is	  used	  to	  fetch	  error	  type	  messages	  from	  the	  system	  log.	  
	  
Get-Eventlog system | where { $_.EntryType -eq 'Error' } 
| select time,source,message 
	  
Time	  of	  the	  event,	  process	  name	  and	  error	  message	  are	  selected	  to	  be	  included	  in	  
the	  output.	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8.5. Windows	  Boot	  Process	  
	  
When	  Windows	  machine	  starts,	  Windows	  Boot	  Manager	  is	  first	  loaded	  from	  boot	  
sector.	  Information	  is	  then	  loaded	  from	  Boot	  Configuration	  Data	  Store	  and	  the	  actual	  
loading	  of	  operating	  system	  starts.	  Actions	  that	  the	  system	  takes	  during	  Windows	  
boot	  can	  be	  analyzed	  from	  logs	  if	  they	  exist.	  The	  easiest	  way	  to	  get	  this	  data	  is	  to	  
execute	  Get-­‐WinEvent	  from	  powershell.	  This	  data	  can	  be	  converted	  to	  CSV	  with	  Con-­‐
vertTo-­‐csv	  parameter.	  The	  output	  lists	  what	  listeners	  have	  started,	  the	  applications	  
that	  have	  been	  allowed	  or	  disallowed	  to	  run,	  or	  executed	  scripts	  and	  their	  sources.	  
	  
	  
8.6. USB	  Device	  History	  
 
Windows	  stores	  information	  and	  history	  of	  connected	  USB	  devices	  in	  the	  registry	  
under	  HKLM:/SYSTEM/CurrentControlSet/Enum/USBSTOR.	  
Get-Itemproperty	  cmd-­‐let	  is	  used	  to	  values	  from	  the	  registry	  path.	  
 
Get-ItemProperty -erroraction SilentlyContinue -path 
HKLM:/SYSTEM/CurrentControlSet/Enum/USBSTOR/*/*  | select 
FriendlyName 
 
If	  information	  is	  not	  cleared	  from	  registry,	  all	  connected	  USB	  devices	  can	  be	  listed.	  	  
FriendlyName,	  however	  is	  not	  the	  best	  filter	  since	  some	  USB	  sticks	  tend	  to	  use	  




8.7. User	  Accounts	  
 
The	  Win32_UserAccount	  class	  contains	  information	  about	  user	  accounts	  on	  a	  Win-­‐
dows	  system.	  Namespace	  value	  is	  root/CIMV2.	  The	  used	  example	  does	  not	  print	  all	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values	  from	  every	  user,	  only	  the	  selected	  ones.	  
	  
Get-wmiobject -class "Win32_UserAccount" -namespace 





If	  command	  is	  run	  in	  Windows	  domain	  controller,	  all	  known	  AD	  account	  information	  
is	  reported.	  Therefore	  the	  results	  list	  might	  be	  long	  and	  due	  to	  the	  contents	  it	  should	  
be	  handled	  carefully.	  Also,	  if	  there	  is	  AD	  federation	  applied	  the	  user	  list	  from	  other	  
domains	  is	  also	  reported.	  Extra	  user	  accounts	  should	  naturally	  be	  investigated.	  
	  
	  
8.8. Windows	  Driver	  Information	  
	  
Windows	  Driver	  Files	  
	  
By	  default	  Windows	  installs	  driver	  files	  to	  c:\windows\system32\drivers.  Drivers	  are	  
not	  always	  hardware	  device	  drivers,	  but	  can	  also	  be	  software	  of	  virtual	  device	  driv-­‐
ers.	  In	  that	  case	  the	  path	  can	  be	  something	  else	  and	  a	  typical	  example	  of	  this	  is	  anti-­‐
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List	  of	  Drivers	  
	  
DOS	  command	  driverquery is	  used	  for	  getting	  the	  driver	  information	  that	  in	  the	  
example	  includes	  name	  of	  the	  driver,	  if	  it	  is	  loaded	  and	  the	  file	  path. 
	  
$scriptdrivers = { driverquery /v } 
$DriverQuery = Invoke-Command -scriptblock $scriptdrivers 
-erroraction SilentlyContinue | Select-object 'Display 
Name','Start Mode','Path' 
 
Antivirus	  products	  and	  virtualization	  drivers	  often	  load	  their	  drivers	  from	  their	  own	  
paths	  and	  make	  an	  exception.	  An	  example	  sign	  of	  intrusion	  is	  that	  a	  driver	  is	  placed	  
to	  ‘<drive	  letter>:\System	  Volume	  Information’	  folder.	  This	  hidden	  folder	  is	  used	  by	  
Windows	  for	  such	  operations	  as	  providing	  System	  Restore	  functionality,	  and	  the	  




Signing	  of	  Driver	  Files	  
	  
64-­‐bit	  Windows	  default	  policy	  requires	  that	  drivers	  are	  signed	  (Driver	  signing	  policy,	  
msdn.microsoft.com).	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case	  in	  32-­‐bit	  Windows	  or	  if	  the	  policy	  
has	  been	  modified	  to	  allow	  such	  behavior.	  Again	  dos	  command	  driverquery	  is	  
used	  to	  fetch	  signing	  information.	  
 
$scriptdrivers2 = { driverquery -si } 
$DriverQuery2 = Invoke-Command -scriptblock $scriptdriv-
ers2  -erroraction SilentlyContinue | Select-object 'De-
viceName','InfName','IsSigned','Manufacturer' 
	  
The	  name	  of	  the	  device,	  actual	  driver	  filename,	  signing	  status	  and	  manufacturer	  in-­‐
formation	  are	  selected	  to	  the	  output	  in	  the	  example.	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Driver	  File	  Dates	  
	  
In	  the	  example	  driver	  information	  is	  queried	  with	  driverquery	  command	  and	  extra	  
characters	  are	  stripped	  out	  for	  convenience.	  The	  output	  is	  then	  written	  to	  driver-­‐
list.txt	  file.	  Then	  get-­‐content	  cmd-­‐let	  is	  executed	  on	  every	  line	  of	  the	  driverslist.txt	  
(driver	  file	  location).	  
	  
Function DriverDates { 
$DList = Invoke-Command -scriptblock $scriptdrivers -
erroraction SilentlyContinue  |% {$_ -replace 
"\\\?\?\\"}| ConvertFrom-Csv | Select-object 'Path'|out-
file "$filepath\driverlist.txt" 
$DriverPaths = get-content "$filepath\driverlist.txt" 
foreach ($line in $DriverPaths) { Get-ChildItem $line -
erroraction SilentlyContinue | Select-Object -Property 
FullName,Lastaccesstime,LastWriteTime} 
   }	  
Get-content	  cml-­‐let	  can	  also	  be	  used	  to	  get	  information	  about	  other	  specific	  files.	  
	  
	  
8.9. Specific	  Anomalies	  from	  Windows	  Registry	  
	  
The	  Windows	  operating	  system	  implements	  ”Image	  file	  execution”	  feature	  inside	  the	  
user-­‐mode	  part	  of	  CreateProcess.	  Image	  file	  execution	  takes	  place	  when	  a	  user	  clicks	  
the	  icons	  that	  execute	  commands.	  After	  the	  operating	  system	  has	  determined	  what	  
executable	  is	  going	  to	  be	  started	  it	  checks	  the	  registry	  key	  for	  a	  debugger.	  If	  it	  finds	  
one,	  it	  will	  launch	  the	  debugger	  instead	  of	  the	  application.	  (Gregg	  Miskelly,2005,	  
msdn.com)	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By	  assigning	  debug	  option	  like	  cmd.exe	  to	  certain	  image	  file	  execution	  options,	  it	  is	  





NT"\CurrentVersion\"Image File Execution Options"\ -
recurse | foreach { 
Get-Itemproperty -Path $_.PsPath } | Select-Object 
PSPath,Debugger 
       
Some	  of	  the	  possible	  file	  targets	  are:	  Sethc.exe,	  Magnify.exe,	  Login.scr,	  Utilman.exe,	  
but	  also	  almost	  any	  executable	  such	  as	  notepad.exe	  can	  be	  defined.	  	  All	  positive	  re-­‐
sults	  should	  be	  investigated.	  
	  
	  
Internet	  Explorer	  Settings	  
	  
Internet	  explorer	  can	  be	  set	  to	  bypass	  SSL	  certificate	  checking	  and	  bypass	  overall	  
caching	  of	  the	  data.	  If	  these	  changes	  are	  applied,	  there	  might	  not	  then	  be	  signs	  of	  
malware	  communication	  in	  cache	  or	  in	  index.dat	  file,	  which	  keeps	  Internet	  explorer’s	  




	   	  	  	  	  	  
Get-ItemProperty 
HKCU:HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Current











tVersion\"Internet Settings"\  
	  






Microsoft	  Windows	  operating	  systems	  come	  installed	  with	  a	  Windows	  Installer	  en-­‐
gine,	  which	  is	  used	  by	  MSI	  packages	  for	  installation.	  Setting	  specific	  registry	  keys	  or-­‐
ders	  Windows	  Installer	  to	  use	  system	  permissions	  when	  it	  installs	  the	  application	  on	  
the	  system.	  (Margosis,	  2011)	  	  In	  a	  normal	  environment	  applications	  not	  distributed	  
by	  the	  administrator	  are	  installed	  using	  the	  user's	  privileges	  and	  only	  managed	  appli-­‐
cations	  get	  elevated	  privileges.	  For	  a	  package	  to	  use	  elevated	  privileges	  the	  registry	  
name	  “AlwaysInstallElevated”	  must	  exist	  in	  both	  keys	  with	  a	  dword	  value	  of	  1.	  	  
	  
Get-ItemProperty -erroraction SilentlyContinue 
HKLM:HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windo
ws\Installer\ 
Get-ItemProperty -erroraction SilentlyContinue 
HKCU:HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Window
s\Installer\      
If	  the	  results	  indicate	  that	  both	  keys	  have	  “AlwaysInstallElevat-
ed”=dword:00000001 value	  set,	  the	  inspection	  has	  to	  be	  made.	  A	  normal	  user	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account	  can	  use	  this	  feature	  if	  both	  results	  return	  value	  1.	  	  An	  intruder	  could	  use	  only	  
user	  level	  accounts	  and	  still	  control	  the	  machine	  with	  specifically	  build	  MSI	  files.	  
	  
	  
Hidden	  User	  Accounts	  
 
Windows	  operating	  system	  has	  a	  feature	  called	  “Special	  account”.	  Local	  user	  names	  
can	  be	  defined	  in	  the	  registry	  under	  SpecialAccounts	  key.	  User	  is	  then	  hidden	  from	  
login	  screen’s	  user	  selection	  and	  control	  panel	  user	  menu.	  
	  
Get-ChildItem -erroraction SilentlyContinue 
HKLM:\HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\"Windows 
NT"\CurrentVersion\WinLogon\SpecialAccounts\ -recurse | 
Select-Object Name,PSChildName,Property,ValueCount 
	  
Any	  results	  returned	  should	  be	  investigated.	  Some	  organizations	  use	  this	  feature	  to	  
hide	  service	  accounts.	  
 
 
	  Cloned	  Administrator	  Accounts	  
	  
Administrator	  accounts	  can	  be	  cloned	  in	  a	  way	  that	  a	  user	  reported	  with	  user	  rights	  
only	  operates	  actually	  with	  administrative	  rights	  but	  does	  not	  appear	  in	  the	  adminis-­‐
trator’s	  group.	  	  Registry	  values	  reside	  in	  the	  part	  of	  the	  Security	  Accounts	  Manager	  
file,	  SAM	  that	  is	  not	  normally	  accessible	  to	  the	  local	  administrator.	  However,	  this	  part	  
of	  the	  SAM	  is	  accessible	  to	  software	  running	  as	  SYSTEM	  account.	  The	  concept	  is	  to	  
take	  a	  low-­‐privileged	  user	  account	  in	  the	  SAM	  and	  to	  populate	  its	  F	  value	  with	  the	  
data	  from	  the	  built-­‐in	  Administrator	  account’s	  F	  value.	  (Joel	  Scambray,	  Stuart	  
Mcclure,	  2008)	  
	  
Registry	  values	  can	  be	  inspected	  from	  following	  registry	  path 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE/SAM/SAM/Domains/Users 
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The	  automatic	  detection	  of	  this	  can	  be	  difficult	  since	  registry	  editor	  has	  to	  be	  run	  as	  a	  
system.	  After	  gaining	  system	  level	  access,	  the	  method	  exports	  the	  registry	  keys	  for	  
each	  user	  and	  manually	  compares	  the	  F	  and	  V	  values	  for	  each	  user	  to	  those	  of	  the	  
built-­‐in	  Administrator	  account.	  
	  
	  
8.10. Replacement	  or	  Manipulation	  of	  System	  Files	  
	  
Certain	  system	  files	  can	  be	  replaced	  to	  gain	  system	  level	  access	  or	  to	  bypass	  a	  login	  
prompt.	  Such	  example	  files	  are	  Sethc.exe,	  Magnify.exe,	  Login.scr	  and	  Utilman.exe.	  	  
For	  example	  if	  Magnifier.exe	  is	  replaced	  with	  cmd.exe,	  clicking	  magnifier	  in	  
the	  login	  screen	  runs	  the	  command	  prompt	  with	  system	  rights	  instead	  of	  actual	  
magnifier.	  This	  can	  be	  used	  as	  a	  backdoor	  to	  the	  system	  when	  graphical	  desktop	  is	  
used.	  Another	  concern	  are	  trojanized	  system	  binaries.	  With	  this	  technique,	  the	  mal-­‐
ware	  patches	  bytes	  of	  a	  system	  binary	  to	  force	  the	  system	  to	  execute	  the	  malware	  
the	  next	  time	  the	  infected	  binary	  is	  run	  or	  loaded.	  Typical	  targets	  are	  system	  binaries	  
used	  frequently	  in	  normal	  Windows	  operation	  like	  DLLs.	  (Sikorski	  and	  Honig,	  2012).	  





File	  msv1_0.dll	  is	  part	  of	  the	  Windows’s	  authentication	  package	  and	  this	  library	  file	  is	  
responsible	  for	  verifying	  user’s	  authentication.	  Path	  to	  file	  is	  Win-­‐
dows/system32/The.file.msv1_0.dll	  and	  it	  can	  be	  modified	  with	  a	  hex	  editor.	  By	  mak-­‐
ing	  specific	  changes	  to	  this	  file,	  which	  depend	  on	  the	  installed	  operating	  system	  ar-­‐
chitecture,	  intruder	  can	  log	  on	  to	  Windows	  with	  any	  existing	  account	  on	  the	  Win-­‐
dows	  without	  a	  password.	  However,	  if	  Microsofts’s	  Encrypting	  File	  System	  is	  used,	  
user’s	  encrypted	  files	  cannot	  be	  opened.	  	  The	  modification	  requires	  taking	  ownership	  
of	  the	  file	  and	  copying	  it	  outside	  the	  system	  for	  editing.	  (Varsalone,McFadden,	  2012)	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Detection	  of	  manipulated	  msv1_0.dll	  file	  or	  other	  system	  files	  can	  be	  achieved	  
with	  System	  File	  Checker	  utility.	  System	  File	  Checker	  is	  a	  Windows	  built-­‐in	  utility	  that	  
allows	  users	  to	  scan	  for	  corrupted	  system	  files	  in	  Windows	  but	  only	  checks	  Windows	  
own	  Dynamic	  Link	  Library	  files	  and	  the	  third	  party	  files	  remain	  unchecked.	  Utility	  also	  
allows	  restoration	  of	  corrupted	  files	  from	  a	  cached	  copy.	  	  However,	  to	  prevent	  un-­‐
wanted	  system	  changes	  from	  occurring	  /verifyonly	  parameter	  is	  used	  in	  the	  
command.	  This	  way	  detected	  corruptions	  or	  files	  changes	  are	  only	  logged	  to	  
%WINDIR%/Logs/CBS/CBS.log	  file.	  
	  
Invoke-expression –command “sfc /verifyonly” 
	  
Scanning	  usually	  takes	  from	  3	  to	  15	  minutes,	  depending	  on	  the	  system	  resources.	  
	  
	  
Search	  of	  Specific	  Files	  
 
If	  there	  are	  files	  that	  are	  considered	  dangerous	  or	  there	  is	  a	  specific	  list	  of	  files	  that	  
has	  to	  be	  searched	  due	  to	  some	  feature	  of	  recent	  malware.	  	  The	  files	  can	  be	  
searched	  with	  following	  command.	  
 
Get-ChildItem -recurse -path c:\ -Include psexec.exe 
	  
Example file Psexec.exe is	  utility	  that	  enables	  executions	  of	  programs	  on	  remote	  
systems	  without	  preinstalling	  an	  agent.	  The	  recent	  versions	  encrypt	  all	  communica-­‐
tion	  between	  local	  and	  remote	  systems,	  including	  the	  transmission	  of	  command	  in-­‐
formation	  such	  as	  the	  user	  name	  and	  password	  under	  which	  the	  remote	  program	  
executes.	  (Windows	  sysinternals,	  2014).	  Psexec	  has	  actually	  been	  used	  in	  controlling	  
machines	  without	  detection,	  however,	  it	  is	  just	  presented	  here	  as	  an	  example.	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8.11. Windows	  Services	  
	  
From	  anomaly	  perspective	  services	  are	  in	  key	  position.	  An	  intruder	  can	  gain	  persis-­‐
tence	  in	  the	  system	  by	  adding	  or	  modifying	  services.	  Windows	  allows	  tasks	  to	  run	  
without	  their	  own	  processes	  or	  threads	  by	  using	  services	  that	  run	  as	  background	  ap-­‐
plications;	  the	  code	  is	  scheduled	  and	  run	  by	  the	  Windows	  service	  manager	  without	  
user	  input.	  At	  any	  given	  time	  on	  a	  Windows	  operating	  system,	  several	  services	  are	  
running.	  Service	  running	  as	  SYSTEM	  in	  not	  necessarily	  a	  bad	  setting,	  since	  administra-­‐
tive	  privileges	  are	  needed	  to	  install	  such	  service.	  However,	  for	  malware	  writers	  this	  is	  
convenient,	  because	  SYSTEM	  account	  has	  more	  access	  than	  administrator.	  (Sikorski,	  
Honig,	  2012)	  
 
When	  checking	  processes	  as	  simple	  information	  as	  a	  missing	  description	  can	  be	  a	  
sign	  of	  bad	  process.	  Also,	  start-­‐up	  path	  of	  the	  process,	  actual	  executable	  behind	  the	  
service	  and	  loaded	  dynamic	  link	  libraries	  (DLL)	  provide	  useful	  information.	  
	  
	  
	  Running	  Services,	  Stopped	  Services	  and	  Their	  Start-­‐up	  Paths	  
	  
Windows	  services	  are	  either	  running	  or	  at	  stopped	  state.	  Services	  can	  be	  set	  to	  start	  
automatically	  or	  manually	  by	  user.	  Get-­‐WmiObject	  cmd-­‐let	  is	  used	  to	  get	  service	  in-­‐
formation	  from	  the	  system.	  In	  the	  example	  script	  results	  are	  sorted	  in	  a	  way	  that	  
running	  services	  are	  printed	  first.	  
Get-WmiObject win32_service  -erroraction SilentlyContin-
ue | Select 
Name,State,DisplayName,Pathname,ServiceType,StartMode,__P
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Loaded	  DLL	  Files	  Behind	  Services	  
	  
The	  service	  usually	  has	  an	  executable	  that	  is	  running.	  	  This	  executable	  might	  be	  de-­‐
pendant	  on	  a	  dynamic	  link	  library	  files	  within	  the	  system	  and	  they	  must	  be	  loaded	  to	  
memory	  as	  well.	  If	  it	  is	  known	  that	  specific	  DLLs	  are	  used	  for	  DLL	  injection,	  a	  list	  of	  
executables	  and	  their	  loaded	  library	  files	  can	  be	  checked.	  
 
$scripttasklist1 = { tasklist /M } 
$Servicedll = Invoke-Command -erroraction SilentlyContin-
ue -scriptblock $scripttasklist1  | Select-object 'Image 
Name','PID','Modules' 
 
As	  a	  result,	  many	  DLLs	  are	  listed	  and	  the	  list	  itself	  can	  be	  useless	  unless	  there	  is	  some	  
indication	  of	  intrusion	  or	  malware	  activity.	  This	  is	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  knowing	  all	  





Services	  run	  under	  given	  credentials	  and	  these	  credentials	  have	  certain	  user	  rights.	  
Services	  should	  not	  run	  with	  too	  wide	  rights	  and	  therefore	  services	  with	  too	  high	  
privileges	  (like	  SYSTEM)	  should	  be	  inspected.	  Service	  names,	  process	  id	  numbers	  and	  
used	  user	  accounts	  are	  printed	  with	  DOS	  command	  tasklist /V.	  
 
$scripttasklist2 = { tasklist /V }   
Invoke-Command -erroraction SilentlyContinue -scriptblock 
$scripttasklist2 | Select-object 'Image Name','PID','User 
Name' 
 
Note:	  tasklist	  system	  executable	  can	  be	  trojanized	  and	  therefore	  the	  results	  might	  
not	  be	  accurate.	  They	  can	  be	  compared	  with	  the	  results	  of	  port	  scanning	  and	  the	  
information	  that	  the	  registry	  offers	  for	  services.	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Services	  That	  Are	  Not	  Launched	  From	  Typical	  Locations	  
	  
Windows	  protects	  folders	  like	  ”Program	  files”	  with	  User	  Account	  Control	  and	  access	  
rights.	  An	  intruder	  or	  malware	  might	  install	  service	  to	  some	  other	  location	  like	  user	  
folder	  or	  TEMP	  directory	  to	  go	  around	  these	  restrictions.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  some	  ser-­‐
vices	  like	  SQL	  server	  has	  been	  installed	  to	  a	  different	  partition,	  which	  makes	  false	  
positive.	  
 
Function StrangeServicePaths { 
Get-WmiObject Win32_Service -erroraction SilentlyContinue 
|  
Where { $_.PathName -NotMatch '^\"*C\:\\Windows\\.+' } |  
Where { $_.PathName -NotMatch '^\"*C\:\\Program 
Files\\.+' } |  
Where { $_.PathName -NotMatch '^\"*C\:\\Program Files 
\(x86\)\\.+' } |  
Select-object  
@{Name='DisplayName';Expression={$_.DisplayName -join '; 
'}}, 
@{Name='PathName';Expression={$_.PathName -join '; '}} 
 
	  
Another	  interesting	  service	  path	  could	  be	  System Volume Information	  fold-­‐
er,	  which	  is	  a	  hidden	  system	  folder	  that	  the	  System	  Restore	  Tool	  uses	  to	  store	  its	  in-­‐
formation	  and	  restore	  points.	  Usually	  there	  is	  a	  System	  Volume	  Information	  folder	  on	  
every	  partition	  of	  the	  computer.	  Since	  the	  folder	  is	  hidden	  by	  default	  it	  can	  be	  used	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8.12. Network	  Connections	  
	  
Services	  can	  be	  so	  called	  network	  services	  where	  the	  process	  is	  listening	  to	  the	  net-­‐
work	  and	  waiting	  for	  client	  connection.	  A	  process	  can	  also	  be	  a	  client	  that	  connects	  
to	  another	  system	  over	  the	  network.	  Currently	  open	  network	  connections	  can	  be	  
listed	  by	  executing	  netstat	  command.	  
 
$scriptnetstat = { netstat -an } 
Invoke-Command -scriptblock $scriptnetstat -erroraction 
SilentlyContinue | select-string LISTEN-
ING,ESTABLISHED,"TIME-WAIT" | select Line,Pattern	  
 
Strange	  port	  and	  Internet	  Protocol	  addresses	  should	  be	  investigated.	  However,	  re-­‐
sults	  are	  not	  accurate	  because	  rootkit	  or	  malware	  can	  hide	  itself	  from	  netstat	  com-­‐
mand.	  Processes	  and	  ports	  can	  be	  compared	  to	  service	  details,	  the	  network	  scans	  the	  
results	  and	  the	  results	  of	  passive	  analysis.	  
	  
	  
8.13. Startup	  Programs	  
 
Following	  registry	  keys	  usually	  contain	  programs	  or	  program	  paths	  that	  are	  automat-­‐
ically	  run	  during	  system	  startup	  without	  requiring	  user	  interaction.	  Malware	  could	  
use	  this	  feature	  to	  make	  it	  start	  at	  every	  startup	  and	  gain	  persistence.	  
 
HKLM\ SOFTWARE \Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run  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Items	  under	  Run	  or	  RunServices	  keys	  are	  executed	  everytime	  a	  user	  logs	  in.	  RunOnce	  
and	  RunServicesOnce	  are	  executed	  only	  once	  when	  the	  user	  logs	  in	  and	  then	  registry	  
key	  is	  deleted.	  When	  item	  under	  RunOnceEx	  registry	  key	  is	  executed,	  	  a	  dialog	  box	  is	  
displayed	  while	  the	  items	  contained	  in	  the	  registry	  key	  are	  being	  processed.	  
	  
In	  Windows	  Vista,	  Windows	  Server	  2008,	  Windows	  7	  and	  Windows	  Server	  2008	  R2	  
the	  RunOnceEx	  registry	  key	  does	  not	  exist	  by	  default.(support.microsoft.com) 
 
 
8.14. Installed	  Software	  
 
Depending	  on	  the	  processor	  and	  operating	  system	  architecture,	  and	  on	  audit	  per-­‐
spective,	  there	  are	  basically	  three	  software	  types	  installed	  on	  the	  Windows	  system:	  
32-­‐bit	  programs,	  64-­‐bit	  programs	  and	  MSI	  packages.	  32	  and	  64-­‐bit	  programs	  are	  typ-­‐
ically	  installed	  to	  different	  directories	  in	  the	  hard	  drive	  and	  information	  about	  them	  
is	  stored	  in	  different	  locations	  of	  Windows	  registry.	  
 
MSI	  is	  an	  installer	  package	  file	  format	  used	  by	  Windows.	  MSI	  files	  can	  be	  used	  for	  
installation,	  storage,	  and	  removal	  of	  programs.	  The	  files	  are	  contained	  in	  a	  package,	  
which	  is	  used	  with	  the	  program’s	  client-­‐side	  installer	  service,	  an	  .EXE	  file,	  to	  open	  and	  
install	  the	  program.	  (MSI	  ,	  techtarget).	  For	  MSI	  package	  installation	  Windows	  Install-­‐
er	  package	  is	  needed	  on	  the	  computer.	  
	  
	  
List	  of	  Installed	  MSI	  Lackages	  
 
A	  list	  of	  installed	  MSI	  packages	  can	  be	  queried	  using	  powershell	  with	  Get-­‐WmiObject	  
cmd-­‐let	  and	  an	  example	  command	  lists	  name	  of	  the	  software,	  version	  number,	  name	  
of	  the	  package,	  date	  of	  installation	  and	  vendor	  information.	  MSI	  packages	  are	  com-­‐
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mon	  and	  therefore	  the	  system	  administrator	  probably	  knows	  best	  what	  packages	  are	  
normal	  and	  what	  are	  not.	  
 
Get-WmiObject win32_Product -erroraction SilentlyContinue 
| Select Name,Version,PackageName,Installdate,Vendor | 
Sort Installdate -Descending 
 
 
List	  of	  Installed	  32	  bit	  Programs	   	   	   	  
 
Windows	  stores	  uninstall	  information	  of	  installed	  32	  bit	  programs	  in	  following	  regis-­‐
try	  path:	  
HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall.	  
Powershell’s	  Get-ChildItem	  cmd-­‐let	  can	  be	  used	  to	  get	  values	  and	  information	  








List	  of	  Installed	  64	  bit	  Programs	   	   	   	  
 




Since	  the	  registry	  path	  is	  different	  from	  32-­‐bit	  programs	  extra	  query	  has	  to	  be	  made.	  
 
 





on\Uninstall -Recurse -erroraction SilentlyContinue | Se-
lect-object PSChildName,PSPath 
 
If	  the	  system	  has	  a	  long	  history,	  programs	  propably	  have	  been	  installed,	  upgraded	  
and	  uninstalled.	  Data	  pertaining	  to	  programs	  that	  are	  (or	  were	  at	  one	  time)	  installed	  




8.15. Dynamic	  Registry	  Searches	  
	  
Windows	  registry	  stores	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  information	  that	  can	  be	  static	  or	  dynamic.	  
Following	  examples	  show	  how	  to	  search	  IP	  addresses	  by	  using	  optional	  regular	  ex-­‐
pressions	  from	  registry.	  Malware	  might	  store	  IP	  addresses	  in	  clear	  text	  in	  Windows	  
registry.	  Windows	  also	  stores	  history	  about	  Web	  addresses	  that	  users	  have	  typed	  or	  
opened.	  	  	  
 
 
IP	  and	  Web	  Addresses	  From	  Registry	  
 
Windows	  registry	  stores	  IP	  addresses	  and	  Web	  addresses	  set	  by	  software	  or	  operat-­‐
ing	  system.	  Addresses	  can	  be	  statically	  set	  for	  later	  use	  or	  collected	  as	  connection	  
history.	  In	  the	  example	  script	  the	  wanted	  values	  are	  defined	  with	  regular	  expression	  
language.	  The	  problem	  with	  Internet	  Protocol	  addresses	  is	  that	  their	  form	  can	  be	  
similar	  to	  software	  version	  numbers.	  Internet	  protocol	  v4	  addresses	  consist	  of	  four	  
decimal	  numbers,	  each	  ranging	  from	  0	  to	  255,	  separated	  by	  dots.	  Therefore,	  the	  ad-­‐
dress	  1.2.3.4	  can	  also	  be	  software	  version	  number.	  	  The	  example	  script	  searches	  
from	  HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE	  registry	  hive	  which	  contains	  most	  of	  the	  windows	  con-­‐
figuration	  data.	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Function RegistryIP-HKLM { 
Get-ChildItem HKLM:\ -rec -erroraction SilentlyContinue | 
foreach { 
$CurrentKey = (Get-ItemProperty -Path $_.PsPath) 
select-string "\b\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\b" -
input $CurrentKey -AllMatches | foreach {($_.matches)| 
get-unique |select-object -unique Value} 
   } 
      } 
	  
By	  using	  the	  following	  regular	  expression	  filter	  instead	  web	  addresses	  can	  be	  
searched	  and	  listed	  similarly.	  
	  
select-string "\b(ht|f)tp(s?)[^ ]*\.[^ ]*(\/[^ ]*)*\b"	  
	  
These	  searches	  can	  also	  be	  run	  against	  HKEY_CURRENT_USER,	  
HKEY_CURRENT_CONFIG	  and	  HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT	  registry	  hives.	  
	  
Searching	  connection	  history	  can	  be	  against	  the	  privacy	  law	  without	  a	  user’s	  permis-­‐
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Concept	  of	  Linux	  is	  that	  everything	  is	  done	  with	  files.	  Configurations	  are	  stored	  in	  
files,	  commands	  and	  processes	  are	  executed	  with	  files.	  Instead	  of	  having	  files	  with	  
specific	  extensions,	  executables	  are	  defined	  with	  special	  permissions	  given	  to	  the	  file.	  
Due	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  security	  implementation	  of	  files	  and	  filesystem,	  Linux	  auditing	  
requires	  more	  manual	  processing	  than	  Windows.	  Plenty	  of	  file	  permissions	  have	  to	  
be	  verified	  and	  configurations	  interpreted.	  An	  intruder	  can	  take	  advantage	  of	  file	  
security	  and	  manipulate	  Linux	  filesystem	  in	  many	  ways.	  	  
	  
The	  difficulty	  in	  Linux	  security	  are	  rootkits	  that	  are	  hard	  to	  detect.	  For	  example,	  Linux	  
rootkit	  LRK	  replaces	  valid	  common	  command	  binaries	  like	  chfn, chsh, 
crontab, du, find, ifconfig, inetd, killall, login, ls, 
netstat, passwd, pidof, ps, rshd, syslogd, tcpd, top, 
sshd, and su	  with	  trojanized	  versions.	  These	  versions	  give	  false	  information	  if	  
they	  are	  executed	  and	  therefore,	  if	  possible,	  it	  would	  be	  good	  to	  get	  the	  same	  infor-­‐
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9.1. File	  Permissions	  in	  Linux	  
	  
Stat	  is	  a	  Linux	  command	  that	  gives	  detailed	  information	  from	  wanted	  files.	  	  
The	  following	  is	  an	  example	  of	  an	  output	  of	  command	  $stat /root/foo.txt. 
The	  explanations	  of	  the	  results	  are	  presented	  in	  Table	  7.	  
	  
”File: `/root/foo.txt' 
Size: 1927      Blocks: 8          IO Block: 4096   regular file 
Device: 801h/2049d Inode: 1050715     Links: 1 
Access: (0644/-rw-r--r--)  Uid: (    0/    root)   Gid: (    0/    
root) 
Access: 2014-02-12 21:02:26.897153312 +0200 
Modify: 2014-02-12 21:02:25.409180584 +0200 
Change: 2012-02-12 21:02:25.417180437 +0200 
Birth: -” 
	  
Table	  7	  Explanations	  of	  Stat	  command	  results.	  (Unix	  Stat	  Command)	  
	  
Fieldname	   Value	   Explanation	  
File	   `/root/foo.txt’	   Absolute path name of the file	  
Size	   1927	   File size in bytes	  
Blocks	   8	   Total number of blocks used by this file	  
IO	  Block	   4096	   IO block size for this file	  
Regular	  
file	  
Regular	  file	   Indicates	  the	  file	  type.	  Available	  file	  types:	  
regular	  file.	  (	  ex:	  all	  normal	  files	  ),	  directory.	  (	  
ex:	  directories	  ),	  socket.	  (	  ex:	  sockets	  ),	  	  sym-­‐
bolic	  link.	  (	  ex:	  symbolic	  links.	  ),	  block	  special	  
file	  (	  ex:	  hard	  disk	  ),	  character	  special	  file.	  (	  ex:	  
terminal	  device	  file	  ).	  
	  
Device	   801h/2049d 	   Device number in hex and device number in 
decimal	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Inode	   1050715	   Inode number is a unique number for each file 
which is used for the internal maintenance by 
the file system	  
Links	   1	   Number of links to the file	  
Access	   (0644/-rw-r—r--)	   Access specifier displayed in both octal and 
character format. 
	  
Uid	   ( 0/ root)	   File owner’s user id and user name are dis-
played	  
Gid	   ( 0/ root)	   File owner’s group id and group name are dis-
played	  
Access	   2014-­‐02-­‐12	  
21:02:26.897153312	  
+0200	  
Last access time of the file	  
Modify	   2014-­‐02-­‐12	  
21:02:25.409180584	  
+0200	  
Last modification time of the file. 
	  
Change	   2012-­‐03-­‐12	  
21:02:25.417180437	  
+0200	  




File	  Permissions	  in	  Octal	  Format	  
	  
This	  information	  about	  the	  file	  is	  displayed	  in	  the	  Access	  field	  of	  the	  previous	  exam-­‐
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Table	  8	  Meaning	  of	  octal	  values	  
Value	   Meaning	  
4	   Read	  permission	  
2	   Write	  permission	  
1	   Execute	  permission	  
	  
	  
Numbers	  can	  be	  added	  up	  to	  get	  other	  kind	  of	  permissions.	  Table	  9	  presents	  mean-­‐
ing	  of	  added	  up	  values.	  
	  
Table	  9	  Meaning	  of	  added	  up	  octal	  values.	  
	  
Value	   Sum	   Meaning	  
7	   4+2+1	   Read/Write/Execute	  
6	   4+2	   Read/Write	  
5	   4+1	   Read/Execute	  
4	   4	   Read	  
3	   2+1	   Write/Execute	  
2	   2	   Write	  
1	   1	   Execute	  
	  
	  
File	  Permission	  in	  Character	  Format	  
	  
This	  information	  about	  the	  file	  is	  displayed	  in	  the	  Access	  field	  of	  the	  example	  com-­‐
mand	  
• File	  Type:	  First	  bit	  of	  the	  field	  mentions	  the	  type	  of	  the	  file.	  
• User	  Permission:	  2nd,	  3rd	  and	  4th	  character	  specifies	  the	  read,	  write	  and	  ex-­‐
ecute	  permission	  of	  the	  user.	  
• Group	  Permission:	  5th,	  6th	  and	  7th	  character	  specifies	  the	  read,	  write	  and	  
execute	  permission	  of	  the	  group.	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• Others	  Permission:	  8th,	  9th	  and	  10th	  character	  specifies	  the	  read,	  write	  and	  
execute	  permission	  of	  the	  others.	  
(thegeekstuff,2009)	  
	  
The	  results	  of	  ls	  or	  stat	  command	  cannot	  be	  fully	  trusted.	  An	  intruder	  can	  modify	  
Linux	  file	  dates	  to	  look	  like	  they	  were	  not	  modified	  lately.	  Information	  can	  therefore	  
be	  misleading.	  For	  example,	  date	  modifications	  can	  be	  made	  with	  touch –r	  com-­‐
mand.	  	  
	  
Touch –r existing_filename_with_wanted_timestap tar-
get_file 
	  
The	  command	  replaces	  the	  modification	  timestamp	  of	  target	  files	  with	  source	  files	  
modification	  timestamp.	  This	  looks	  normal	  when	  ls	  command	  is	  used;	  however,	  the	  




9.2. Anomalies	  From	  Linux	  Logs	  
	  
Linux	  logging	  configuration	  is	  checked	  during	  audit	  as	  a	  normal	  procedure.	  
Often	  last command	  is	  used	  to	  run	  the	  report	  of	  previously	  logged	  on	  users	  and	  
their	  usernames.	  Missing	  log	  files	  or	  changed	  log	  configuration	  file	  can	  be	  a	  sign	  of	  
intrusion.	  By	  default	  in	  most	  distributions	  logs	  are	  archived	  every	  4	  weeks.	  To	  extract	  
the	  archived	  files,	  disk	  space	  and	  proper	  commands	  have	  to	  be	  available.	  Some	  
commands	  can	  parse	  archived	  file	  on-­‐the-­‐fly;	  however,	  they	  do	  not	  necessarily	  exist	  
within	  the	  system.	  To	  print	  the	  contents	  of	  a	  file	  one	  could	  use	  ”cat file”	  com-­‐
mand.	  But	  if	  a	  file	  is	  archived	  and	  packed	  one	  could	  use	  ”zcat log.gz” 	  instead.	  
Zcat	  and	  similar	  commands	  are	  not	  always	  available,	  and	  therefore	  the	  system	  be-­‐
ing	  audited	  decides	  which	  is	  the	  better	  method.	  	  
	  





In	  Linux	  or	  Unix	  operating	  systems	  sudo	  is	  a	  program	  that	  allows	  users	  to	  run	  pro-­‐
grams	  with	  the	  security	  privileges	  of	  another	  user.	  	  Rights	  that	  sudo	  user	  can	  have	  
are	  full	  rights	  (superuser),	  or	  limited	  rights	  to	  specific	  commands.	  Accounts	  that	  have	  
used	  their	  sudo	  rights	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  auth.log	  file	  by	  searching	  lines	  containing	  
word	  ”sudo”	  from	  log	  file.	  	  
 
grep sudo /var/log/auth.log 
	  





In	  Linux	  attached	  USB	  device	  appears	  in	  the	  /var/log/dmesg	  	  file.	  
For	  USB	  device	  history	  the	  file	  can	  be	  inspected	  by	  searching	  lines	  that	  contain	  the	  
word	  USB.	  	  
	  
grep USB /var/log/dmesg	  
	  
Typically	  the	  date,	  product	  id,	  vendor	  id	  and	  friendly	  names	  are	  found;	  however,	  just	  
like	  in	  Windows	  a	  friendly	  name	  is	  not	  always	  available,	  instead	  the	  result	  might	  be	  
just	  a	  device	  id	  in	  numeric	  format.	  
	  
	  
9.3. Loaded	  Drivers	  and	  Modules	  
	  
Linux	  kernel	  module	  is	  a	  compiled	  code	  that	  can	  be	  inserted	  into	  the	  kernel	  at	  run-­‐
time.	  Common	  commands	  to	  do	  so	  in	  live	  system	  are	  insmod	  or	  modprobe.	  A	  
driver	  is	  a	  code	  that	  runs	  in	  the	  kernel	  to	  talk	  to	  some	  hardware	  device.	  A	  driver	  may	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be	  built	  statically	  into	  the	  kernel	  file	  on	  disk.	  A	  driver	  may	  also	  be	  built	  as	  a	  kernel	  
module	  so	  that	  it	  can	  be	  dynamically	  loaded	  later.	  Loaded	  drivers	  and	  modules	  can	  
be	  verified	  in	  couple	  of	  ways.	  One	  is	  running	  lsmod	  command	  which	  return	  statuses	  
of	  loaded	  kernel	  modules.	  With modinfo	  command	  one	  can	  check	  specific	  module	  
or	  driver	  details.	  Another	  way	  is	  to	  check	  contents	  of /proc/modules folder.	  
There	  results	  can	  be	  compared	  with	  each	  other.	  One	  can	  also	  verify	  dates	  and	  paths	  
of	  the	  loaded	  driver	  files	  just	  like	  in	  windows.	  
	  
	  
Driver	  Information	  Comparison	  
	  
This	  method	  uses	  lsmod command	  to	  get	  full	  information	  loaded	  modules	  and	  
outputs	  them	  to	  text	  file.	  Full	  output	  of	  results	  is	  valuable	  if	  further	  inspection	  is	  
needed.	  
 
$lsmod | grep -v Module > drivers_from_lsmod_full.txt 
	  
To	  list	  of	  only	  the	  module	  names,	  lsmod	  command	  is	  used	  and	  only	  the	  module	  
name	  field	  is	  selected	  and	  outputted	  to	  text	  file.	  This	  could	  also	  be	  achieved	  by	  pars-­‐
ing	  module	  names	  from	  previous	  text	  file	  that	  contains	  the	  full	  output.	  
	  
$lsmod | grep -v Module| cut -d ' ' -f1 > driv-
ers_from_lsmod.txt 
	  
This	  method	  gets	  the	  module	  information	  directly	  from	  the	  filesystem.	  Cat	  com-­‐
mand	  is	  used	  to	  fetch	  the	  contents	  of	  the	  /proc/modules/	  folder.	  Only	  the	  first	  
field	  (module	  name)	  of	  output	  is	  selected.	  
	  
$cat /proc/modules | cut -d ' ' -f1 > driv-
ers_from_proc.txt 
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Diff	  command	  finds	  differences	  between	  the	  lines	  of	  two	  or	  more	  files.	  Here	  con-­‐
tents	  of	  previous	  commands	  are	  compared	  with	  each	  other.	  Normally	  there	  should	  
not	  be	  any	  differences.	  
	  





Getting	  driver	  information	  with	  one	  command	  requires	  two	  phases.	  First,	  module	  
names	  are	  extracted	  from	  lsmod	  results.	  
	  
Module (name)                  Size    Used by 
nls_utf8               12416    1  
nls_cp437             12417    1  
vfat                     17157    1 
… 
	  
The	  output	  lists	  installed	  kernel	  modules,	  their	  sizes	  and	  state	  of	  usage.	  
	  
Next,	  results	  are	  used	  as	  input	  to	  modinfo	  command	  that	  gives	  details	  of	  the	  mod-­‐
ule.	  	  
Command	  $modinfo nls_utf8 gives	  following	  details	  from	  module	  named	  
nls_utf8.	  
	  
filename:       /lib/modules/3.10-3-686-
pae/kernel/fs/nls/nls_utf8.ko 
license:        Dual BSD/GPL 
depends:         
intree:         Y 
vermagic:       3.10-3-686-pae SMP mod_unload modversions 
686 
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Information	  contains	  location	  of	  the	  module	  file,	  license	  information,	  dependencies	  
on	  other	  modules	  or	  libraries	  and	  kernel	  information.	  
	  
The	  full	  command	  is	  presented	  as	  follows	  and	  the	  output	  is	  directed	  to	  text	  file.	  
	  
modinfo `lsmod | grep -v Module| cut -d ' ' -f1` > driv-
er_details.txt 
	  
The	  examination	  requires	  a	  manual	  review	  of	  the	  output	  files.	  A	  simple	  missing	  de-­‐





The	  previous	  modinfo	  output	  already	  contains	  file	  paths	  and	  they	  can	  be	  collected	  
with	  the	  following	  command.	  The	  purpose	  is	  to	  use	  results	  in	  the	  next	  command	  that	  
gets	  the	  driver	  file	  details	  such	  as	  file	  dates.	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Driver	  and	  Module	  Filedates	  
	  
Driver	  files	  are	  fed	  to	  stat command,	  which	  gives	  detailed	  information	  of	  the	  files.	  
Function	  runs	  stat command	  to	  every	  file	  listed	  in	  the	  previous	  output	  file.	  
	  
function driver_file_dates { 
while read line            
do            
    stat $line 
done < driver_paths.txt 
} 
driver_file_dates > driver_file_dates.txt 
	  
	  
9.4. Change	  and	  Creation	  Dates	  of	  Specific	  Files	  
 
Important	  or	  otherwise	  interesting	  file	  dates	  and	  rights	  can	  be	  verified	  with	  stat	  
command.	  The	  command	  lists	  access	  rights,	  last	  access	  date,	  last	  modification	  date,	  
and	  change	  date.	  At	  least	  the	  following	  files	  should	  be	  checked	  since	  they	  control	  







Logging	  settings	  and	  location	  of	  the	  configuration	  files	  depend	  on	  used	  log	  daemon:	  
syslog, syslog-ng, rsyslog (remote	  logging).	  These	  files	  are	  usually	  keys	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The	  installed	  and	  used	  service	  configurations	  can	  be	  checked	  accordingly.	  
	  
	  
9.5. Hidden	  or	  Abnormal	  Files	  
 
In	  Linux,	  the	  files	  can	  be	  hidden	  from	  a	  user	  by	  adding	  dot	  (.)	  in	  front	  of	  the	  file.	  
Normal	  file	  listing	  command	  ls	  does	  not	  show	  them	  unless	  parameter	  -a	  is	  given.	  
Some	  of	  the	  hiding	  techniques	  rely	  on	  humans’	  way	  to	  interpret	  visual	  data.	  If	  ls –
la	  command	  is	  executed,	  Linux	  and	  Unix	  list	  two	  directories	  in	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  
output:	  
 
drwxr-xr-x  2 root root   4096 Mar 12 23:06 . 
drwxr-xr-x 29 root root 344064 Mar 12 22:41 .. 
 
Single	  dot	  means	  current	  directory.	  Two	  dots	  refer	  to	  the	  previous	  directory	  in	  the	  
directory	  tree.	  
	  
The	  find	  command	  could	  be	  limited	  with	  –xdev	  parameter.	  That	  way	  the	  command	  
does	  not	  escape	  to	  external	  shares.	  To	  find	  all	  hidden	  files	  or	  directories	  (any	  file-­‐
name	  that	  starts	  with	  a	  dot)	  the	  following	  command	  can	  be	  used.	  Typically	  there	  are	  
plenty	  results	  if	  the	  whole	  filesystem	  is	  searched.	  
	  
$find / -name ”.*” 
The	  user	  can	  be	  visually	  distracted	  to	  miss	  file	  or	  directory	  names	  due	  to	  the	  file	  list-­‐
ing	  method	  where	  the	  output	  already	  has	  ”.”	  and	  ”..”	  file	  names.	  
An	  example	  is	  as	  follows:	  three	  dots	  for	  a	  file	  name. 
$find / -name "..." -print 2> /dev/null 
 
Example	  :	  dot	  and	  space	  for	  a	  file	  name	  is	  given	  below.	  
$find / -name ". " -print 2> /dev/null 
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9.6. File	  Discovery	  
 
Files	  can	  also	  be	  hidden	  to	  directories	  where	  people	  do	  not	  usually	  look.	  	  Directory	  
might	  not	  be	  expected	  to	  have	  any	  normal	  files	  and	  therefore	  is	  not	  normally	  rou-­‐
tinely	  searched.	  One	  directory	  example	  is	  /dev.	  To	  find	  regular	  non-­‐device	  files	  hid-­‐
den	  in	  /dev:	  	  
find /dev -type f -print 2> /dev/null 
However,	  there	  might	  be	  acceptable	  files	  like	  /dev/MAKEDEV.   
	  
	  
Setuid	  and	  Setgid	  Shells	  Owned	  by	  Root	  
 
Setuid	  and	  setgid	  programs	  run	  with	  the	  privileges	  of	  the	  file	  owner	  or	  a	  group.	  
Intruder	  who	  has	  gained	  root	  privileges	  may	  place	  a	  copy	  of	  /bin/bash	  in	  a	  differ-­‐
ent	  location	  and	  use	  the	  chmod command	  with	  the	  u+g+s+x	  parameter	  to	  set	  the	  
setuid	  flag	  on	  it.	  After	  this	  is	  done,	  the	  intruder	  may	  log	  in	  again	  with	  a	  non-­‐root	  
account	  and	  simply	  run	  the	  setuid’s	  bash	  executable	  to	  obtain	  a	  root	  shell	  and	  root	  
password	  is	  not	  needed.	  	  
 
Command	  that	  finds	  setuid	  files.	  
 
$find / -perm -4000 -type f -print 2> /dev/null 
 
Command	  that	  finds	  setgid	  files.	  
 
$find / -perm -2000 -type f -print 2> /dev/null 
	  
Both	  commands	  by	  default	  return	  files	  that	  have	  setuid or	  setgid flag	  on.	  In-­‐
stant	  unauthenticated	  root	  level	  access	  is	  offered	  by	  copied	  shell	  binaries	  like	  sh,	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If	  the	  user	  is	  removed	  from	  the	  system,	  there	  might	  be	  files	  that	  old	  User	  ID	  still	  
owns.	  These	  files	  are	  not	  necessarily	  automatically	  deleted	  when	  the	  account	  itself	  is	  
removed	  and	  might	  contain	  data	  that	  should	  not	  be	  available	  to	  everyone.	  To	  find	  
the	  paths	  of	  orphaned	  files,	  find command	  with	  the	  -nouser	  argument	  can	  be	  
used.	  
 





Cron	  or	  crontab	  is	  a	  Linux	  equivalent	  to	  scheduled	  tasks	  in	  Windows.	  Scheduled	  tasks	  
can	  also	  be	  used	  by	  users	  if	  allowed.	  Therefore	  every	  user	  can	  have	  their	  own	  sched-­‐
uling	  configuration	  and	  a	  check	  has	  to	  be	  made	  per	  user	  basis.	  The	  check	  can	  be	  
made	  by	  extracting	  usernames	  from	  /etc/passwd	  file	  and	  checking	  if	  crontab	  has	  a	  
configuration	  for	  that	  username.	  Root	  accounts	  crontab	  has	  to	  be	  checked	  separately	  
if	  command	  is	  run	  under	  root	  account.	  
	  
Crontab	  command	  with	  –l	  parameter	  lists	  current	  users	  (account	  command	  is	  
being	  run	  as)	  scheduled	  tasks.	  The	  output	  is	  directed	  to	  text	  file.	  
 
crontab -l >> user_crontabs.txt 
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Crontab	  command	  with	  –u	  parameter	  shows	  given	  usernames	  scheduled	  tasks.	  
Usernames	  are	  first	  fetched	  from	  /etc/passwd	  file	  and	  crontab	  is	  then	  queried	  for	  
every	  configured	  username.	  
 
function cron { 
for user in $(cat /etc/passwd| cut -f1 -d:); 




Under	  Ubuntu	  or	  Debian,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  view	  crontab	  by	  opening	  	  folder	  
/var/spool/cron/crontabs/	  and	  then	  a	  file	  for	  each	  user	  is	  there.	  But	  that	  is	  
only	  for	  user-­‐specific	  crontab	  and	  system	  cron	  has	  to	  be	  checked	  separately.	  
RedHat	  has	  similar	  /var/spool/cron	  directory.	  Checking	  the	  cron	  via	  these	  files	  
is	  easier	  if	  user	  accounts	  are	  centrally	  managed.	  
	  






9.8. Rhosts	  and	  Hosts.equiv	  
	  
.rhosts	  file	  (hidden	  file)	  defines	  which	  remote	  hosts	  can	  invoke	  certain	  commands	  
on	  the	  local	  host	  without	  supplying	  a	  password.	  This	  can	  be	  used	  to	  access	  the	  oper-­‐
ating	  system	  later	  on.	  	  
	  
$find / –name .rhosts 
	  
All	  results	  are	  bad,	  even	  from	  normal	  security	  perspective.	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/etc/hosts.equiv	  that	  provides	  the	  same	  functionality	  as	  .rhosts	  
The	  /etc/hosts.equiv file	  contains	  a	  list	  of	  hostnames	  and	  users	  that	  are	  con-­‐
sidered	  trusted.	  Services	  such	  as	  rlogin,	  rsh,	  rcp,	  and	  rcpmd	  use	  this	  file	  to	  determine	  
trusted	  entities.	  	  
	  
	  
9.9. PATH	  Variables	  
	  
When	  a	  user	  executes	  a	  command,	  the	  command	  shell	  searches	  for	  the	  location	  of	  
the	  command	  in	  the	  list	  of	  directories	  contained	  in	  the	  PATH	  environment	  variable.	  
If	  an	  attacker	  plants	  a	  trojanized	  binary	  to	  users	  home	  folder	  and	  ads	  ”.”	  to	  the	  envi-­‐
ronment’s	  PATH	  variable	  ,	  the	  command	  is	  executed	  from	  there	  instead	  of	  the	  nor-­‐
mal	  path.	  For	  the	  operating	  system	  ”.”	  stands	  for	  current	  directory.	  It	  is	  also	  good	  to	  
check	  all	  PATH	  variables	  from	  all	  users	  since	  binaries	  can	  be	  put	  to	  other	  directories	  
as	  well.	  	  
	  
File	  /etc/profile	  contains	  Linux	  system	  wide	  environment	  and	  startup	  pro-­‐
grams.	  It	  is	  used	  by	  all	  users	  with	  bash,	  ksh,	  sh	  shell.	  It	  is	  usually	  used	  to	  set	  PATH	  
variable,	  user	  limits,	  and	  other	  settings	  for	  user.	  It	  only	  runs	  for	  login	  shell.	  Large	  
changes	  or	  application	  specific	  changes	  are	  configured	  under	  /etc/profile.d/	  
directory.	  
	  
Other	  options	  for	  variables	  are	  .bash_profile	  file	  in	  user’s	  home	  directory,	  which	  
is	  run	  during	  user	  login.	  Another	  option	  is	  .bashrc	  which	  is	  run	  when	  the	  user	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9.10. Linux	  Processes	  
	  
Linux	  processes	  and	  their	  paths	  can	  be	  checked	  in	  ways	  that	  can	  be	  compared.	  	  
One	  way	  is	  running	  ps –ef	  command,	  which	  prints	  process	  id	  number	  (PID)	  and	  
process	  paths.	  PID	  numbers	  can	  also	  be	  found	  in	  /proc	  directory,	  where	  every	  PID	  
number	  is	  its	  own	  directory.	  The	  amount	  and	  existence	  of	  PID	  numbers	  can	  be	  com-­‐
pared	  within	  these	  two	  outputs.	  
	  
If	  Linux	  system	  is	  rootkitted,	  processes	  can	  be	  hidden	  from	  commands	  that	  list	  pro-­‐
cesses	  or	  commands	  refuse	  to	  print	  certain	  processes.	  A	  typical	  trojanized	  command	  




Process	  ID,	  PID	  list	  can	  be	  retrieved	  with	  ps	  command.	  PID	  is	  a	  numerical	  value	  that	  
every	  running	  process	  get	  from	  the	  operating	  system	  or	  kernel.	  Every	  process	  has	  it’s	  
own	  PID	  number.	  Following	  command	  get	  PID	  numbers	  of	  running	  processes	  and	  
writes	  them	  to	  a	  text	  file.	  
	  
ps -ef |awk '{print $2}'|grep -v PID |sort > pids_ps.txt 
	  
	  
PIDS	  from	  /Proc	  
	  
Directory	  /proc	  is	  not	  only	  a	  directory,	  but	  also	  a	  virtual	  filesystem.	  Kernel	  uses	  it	  as	  
a	  kind	  of	  control	  and	  information	  centre	  and	  therefore	  process	  information	  is	  also	  
stored	  there.	  
	  
ls -l /proc |awk '{print $9}' |grep [1-999999] |sort > 
pid s_proc.txt 
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If	  these	  two	  lists	  are	  compared	  with	  each	  other,	  there	  are	  always	  few	  differences.	  





The	  startup	  path	  of	  processes	  can	  be	  collected	  by	  executing	  ps –ef	  command	  and	  
printing	  only	  the	  wanted	  column	  that	  contains	  the	  path	  variable.	  
	  
ps -ef | awk '{print $8}' 
	  
Paths	  can	  be	  also	  examined	  from	  /proc/PIDNUMBER directory	  which	  usually	  has	  





















An	  intruder	  may	  add	  an	  entry	  to	  the	  inetd.conf	  file	  or	  the	  xinetd.d	  directory	  
to	  cause	  inetd	  or	  xinetd to	  serve	  a	  remote	  shell	  on	  a	  specific	  port.	  This	  can	  be	  
done	  by	  configuring	  inetd	  or	  xinetd	  to	  execute	  /bin/bash	  or	  any	  other	  com-­‐
mand	  shell.	  Once	  this	  is	  accomplished,	  an	  attacker	  may	  telnet	  to	  the	  remote	  port	  to	  
gain	  a	  remote	  shell.	  For	  example,	  an	  attacker	  may	  place	  the	  following	  contents	  into	  
the	  file	  /etc/xinetd.d/ domain:	  
	  
     service domain 
     { 
             socket_type     = stream 
             wait            = no 
             user            = root 
             server          = /bin/bash 
             server_args     = -i 
     } 
	  
After	  the	  service	  is	  restarted,	  the	  attacker	  telnets	  to	  port	  53	  and	  gets	  a	  root	  shell.	  
However,	  this	  does	  not	  work	  in	  all	  modern	  systems.	  The	  contents	  of	  the	  service	  files	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10. Passive	  Analysis	  
 
 
Purpose	  of	  Analysis	  
 
The	  purpose	  of	  network	  analysis	  is	  to	  verify	  that	  the	  target	  being	  audited	  works	  as	  
intended	  and	  there	  are	  no	  design	  flaws.	  	  From	  anomaly	  perspective	  it	  is	  interesting	  
to	  discover	  communication	  partners	  and	  what	  is	  being	  communicated.	  Machines	  
could	  be	  a	  part	  of	  a	  botnet,	  or	  some	  malware	  is	  exfiltrating	  data	  out	  of	  the	  network.	  
	  
Data	  exfiltration	  means	  unauthorized	  transfer	  of	  data	  from	  a	  computer.	  Exfiltration	  
can	  be	  done	  with	  a	  variety	  of	  protocols	  and	  typically	  a	  usable	  protocol	  depends	  on	  
what	  kind	  of	  Internet	  connectivity	  is	  possible.	  If	  Internet	  browsing	  is	  possible,	  data	  
exfiltration	  is	  easier	  and	  hacker	  or	  malware	  have	  more	  transfer	  options	  to	  choose	  
from.	  The	  transfer	  could	  be	  done	  for	  example	  with	  different	  hypertext	  transfer	  pro-­‐
tocol	  (http)	  methods	  (for	  example	  posts),	  domain	  name	  service	  (DNS)	  queries	  or	  
email.	  Data	  exfiltration	  can	  be	  carried	  out	  in	  a	  way	  that	  normal	  protocol	  behavior	  is	  
retained.	  	  
	  
Communication	  partners	  can	  be	  inside	  the	  target’s	  network,	  in	  partners’	  network	  or	  
in	  the	  Internet.	  IP	  addresses	  and	  DNS	  names	  that	  come	  from	  internal	  network	  are	  
easier	  to	  track	  and	  analyze	  than	  outside	  ones.  
	  
	  
Sadly,	  cybercriminals	  use	  increasingly	  sophisticated	  methods	  of	  com-­‐
munication	  such	  as	  Domain	  Generation	  Algorithms	  (DGA)	  designed	  to	  
evade	  detection	  in	  the	  growing	  noise	  of	  web	  traffic	  and	  to	  prevent	  the	  
takedown	  of	  a	  botnet.	  DGAs	  are	  algorithms	  used	  by	  malware	  that	  gen-­‐
erate	  domain	  names,	  which	  then	  serve	  as	  rendezvous	  points	  with	  their	  
controllers.	  They	  are	  used	  as	  a	  method	  to	  restore	  communication	  when	  
a	  controller	  is	  offline.	  (Barry Weymes,2013)	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Communication	  is	  not	  necessarily	  taking	  place	  during	  audit.	  Therefore	  historical	  data	  
like	  proxy,	  DNS	  or	  firewall	  logs	  that	  could	  be	  parsed,	  could	  offer	  valuable	  infor-­‐
mation.	  However,	  the	  format	  of	  the	  log	  files	  cannot	  be	  predicted	  which	  means	  that	  




10.1. Traffic	  Capture	  
 
Network	  traffic	  mirroring	  is	  carried	  out	  during	  the	  audit	  so	  that	  all	  traffic	  that	  comes	  
from	  or	  goes	  to	  audited	  target	  is	  captured.	  Typically	  whole	  packets	  (with	  snaplength	  
0	  )	  are	  captured	  and	  saved	  for	  further	  investigation.	  The	  capturing	  time	  is	  usually	  12-­‐
24	  hours	  and	  is	  usually	  limited	  by	  disk	  space.	  Found	  IP	  addresses	  are	  mapped	  and	  IP	  
conversation	  partners	  are	  semi-­‐automatically	  drawn	  to	  a	  map.	  Semi-­‐automatically	  
means	  that	  for	  example	  a	  product,	  Clarified	  analyzer,	  lists	  IP	  addresses;	  however,	  
those	  addresses	  have	  to	  be	  manually	  given	  an	  identity	  in	  a	  graphical	  map.	  The	  ana-­‐
lyzer	  then	  automatically	  draws	  connecting	  lines	  between	  IP	  addresses	  that	  were	  car-­‐
rying	  out	  conversation	  or	  tried	  to	  do	  so	  during	  capture	  period.	  If there is specific	  
data	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  analyzed,	  it	  has	  to	  be	  done	  manually	  with	  Wireshark.	  If	  there	  is	  
plenty	  of	  traffic	  and	  connections,	  analysis	  is	  time	  consuming.	  
 
Following	  are	  examples	  how	  this	  process	  can	  be	  speeded	  up	  and	  simultaneously	  im-­‐
portant	  data	  from	  anomaly	  perspective	  is	  collected.	  In	  the	  examples	  cap-
tured.pcap	  is	  the	  file	  being	  analyzed.	  Live	  capture	  could	  be	  carried	  out	  by	  replac-­‐
ing	  ”-r capture.pcap”	  with	  ”-i Interfacename”.	  The	  same	  things	  in	  the	  
examples	  given	  can	  be	  done	  with	  Wireshark;	  however,	  when	  processing	  multiple	  





	   	   	  
	  
77	  
10.2. Detected	  IP	  Addresses	  
	  
A	  list	  of	  detected	  IP	  addresses	  can	  be	  enlisted	  with	  the	  following	  command.	  The	  
command	  is	  piped	  to	  uniq	  program	  so	  that	  every	  IP	  address	  is	  listed	  only	  once.	  List	  
can	  be	  compared	  to	  list	  of	  unwanted	  or	  dangerous	  IP	  list.	  If	  tunneling	  methods	  like	  
Generic	  routing	  encapsulation	  (GRE)	  is	  detected,	  the	  line	  in	  file	  contains	  two	  or	  more	  
IP	  addresses	  separated	  with	  a	  comma:	  Tunnel	  point	  addresses	  and	  tunneled	  ad-­‐
dresses.	  
 






Following	  command	  lists	  detected	  protocols	  from	  pcap	  file.	  Protocol	  detection	  de-­‐
pends	  on	  software	  version	  and	  is	  not	  necessarily	  accurate	  if	  services	  are	  using	  non-­‐
standard	  ports.	  
	  
tshark -p -r capture.pcap -qz io,phs  
 
If	  there	  are	  strange	  protocols,	  details	  can	  be	  investigated	  with	  Wireshark	  or	  with	  
tshark : tshark –r capture.pcap –R protocolname	  
 
If	  the	  protocol	  and	  expected	  port	  do	  not	  match	  traffic	  can	  be	  decoded	  again.	  
	  
Example:	  
tshark –r capture.pcap -d tcp.port==8888-8890,http	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10.4. Conversation	  Partners	  
 
List	  of	  IP	  addresses	  that	  communicate	  with	  each	  other	  with	  transmission	  control	  pro-­‐
tocol	  (TCP)	  or	  User	  Datagram	  Protocol,	  UDP	  can	  be	  listed	  with	  following	  commands.	  	  
The	  command	  makes	  a	  list	  of	  address	  pairs	  that	  were	  communicating	  during	  capture	  
and	  both	  protocols	  have	  to	  be	  reported	  with	  different	  commands.	  
	  
TCP	  streams	  
tshark -n -p -r capture.pcap -qz conv,tcp 
	  
UDP	  streams	  
tshark -n -p -r capture.pcap -qz conv,udp  
 
 
10.5. Connected	  Devices	  
 
Every	  Ethernet	  based	  device	  has	  a	  MAC	  address	  that	  is	  tied	  to	  network	  card	  or	  port.	  
A	  list	  of	  seen	  unique	  MAC	  addresses	  can	  be	  obtained	  with	  following	  command.	  
 
tshark -p -r capture.pcap -T fields -e eth.dst eth.src 
|sort |uniq  
 
The	  list	  of	  addresses	  can	  be	  compared	  to	  the	  vendor	  list	  and	  unwanted	  devices	  might	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10.6. Keyword	  Search	  
 
Packets	  can	  be	  parsed	  by	  searching	  certain	  keywords	  (like	  in	  this	  example	  hook.js).	  
Additionally,	  hex	  values	  can	  be	  searched.	  The	  output	  is	  then	  written	  to	  a	  new	  file	  that	  
can	  be	  analyzed	  separately.	  
 
tshark -r capture.pcap tcp contains hook.js -w key-
word.pcap 
 
With	  –w	  option	  all	  packets	  that	  contain	  the	  wanted	  keyword	  are	  written	  to	  key-­‐




10.7. Http	  Traffic	  
 
Http	  and	  https	  are	  the	  most	  common	  protocols	  being	  used	  for	  Internet	  browsing.	  
What	  differentiates	  http	  and	  https	  from	  other	  protocols,	  is	  their	  amount	  of	  parame-­‐
ter	  and	  usage	  options.	  And	  from	  the	  data	  infiltration	  perspective,	  the	  options	  does	  
not	  have	  to	  be	  used	  in	  a	  designed	  way.	  For	  example	  both	  POST	  and	  GET	  methods	  can	  





A	  list	  of	  unique	  http	  domains	  can	  be	  listed	  with	  following	  command.	  List	  can	  be	  then	  
compared	  to	  list	  of	  dangerous	  domain	  or	  host	  lists.	  
 









Http	  posts	  can	  reveal	  activity	  that	  is	  using	  http	  posts	  to	  send	  data	  out.	  A	  great	  
amount	  of	  posts	  to	  same	  destination,	  or	  to	  dangerous	  destination	  should	  be	  investi-­‐
gated.	  Also,	  posts	  that	  are	  sending	  files	  (Documents,	  pictures	  etc.)	  might	  indicate	  
ongoing	  data	  exfiltration.	  
	  
tshark -p -r capture.pcap -n -R 





Http	  requests	  and	  optionally,	  their	  received	  response	  can	  be	  listed	  as	  follows.	  Data	  
can	  be	  used	  to	  analyze	  strange	  requests.	  However,	  this	  might	  reveal	  private	  data.	  
 






A	  user-­‐agent	  is	  software	  (a	  software	  agent)	  that	  is	  acting	  on	  behalf	  of	  a	  user.	  
Web	  browsers,	  email	  clients	  and	  system	  components	  have	  often	  their	  own	  agent	  
names.	  	  	  
	  
Format	  of	  a	  typical	  user-­‐agent	  (sans reading room,2013) 
"User-Agent" ":" 1*( product | comment ) 
 
Example	  user-­‐agent	  (sans reading room,2013) 
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 
5.1) 
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Detected	  user-­‐agents	  can	  be	  listed	  with	  the	  following	  command	  and	  strange	  user-­‐
agent	  names	  should	  be	  investigated.	  User-­‐agent	  data	  is	  first	  sorted	  out	  alphabetically	  
and	  then	  every	  user-­‐agent	  is	  reported	  only	  once.	  
 




Http	  Requests	  With	  Empty	  User-­‐agent	  and	  IP	  Address	  
 
Software	  or	  malware	  might	  not	  report	  their	  user-­‐agents	  while	  communicating.	  How-­‐
ever	  some	  antivirus	  vendors	  do	  this	  on	  purpose	  so	  false	  positives	  are	  possible.	  
 
tshark -r capture.pcap -R "http.request==1 and 
http.user_agent" -T fields -e http.user_agent -e ip.addr 
|sort |uniq 
 
Previous	  missing	  user-­‐agent	  reporting	  can	  be	  combined	  with	  address	  the	  user-­‐agent	  
is	  communicating	  to.	  
 
tshark -r capture.pcap -R "http.request.method==”POST” 
and http.user_agent" -T fields -e http.user_agent -e 
ip.addr |sort |uniq 
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10.8. DNS	  Queries	  
 
It	  is	  important	  to	  list	  DNS	  names	  that	  are	  requested	  even	  if	  there	  is	  no	  Internet	  con-­‐
nection.	  For	  example,	  malware	  might	  be	  trying	  to	  contact	  some	  IP	  and	  is	  first	  trying	  
to	  resolve	  DNS	  name	  first.	  Another	  aspect	  is	  data	  infiltration	  where	  DNS	  protocol	  can	  
be	  used	  even	  if	  there	  is	  no	  direct	  Internet	  access	  (only	  DNS	  resolving	  is	  possible).	  
 
Requested	  DNS	  domain	  names	  and	  responses	  can	  be	  listed	  with	  following	  command.	  
 
tshark –r capture.pcap -2 –R dns.resp.addr –T fields –e 
dns.qry.name –e dns.resp.addr 
 
Many	  requests	  to	  the	  same	  domain	  can	  indicate	  malicious	  activity.	  Calculating	  the	  
amount	  of	  queries	  to	  the	  same	  domain	  eases	  the	  task	  of	  detection.	  
	  
This	  list	  can	  also	  be	  compared	  to	  the	  list	  of	  dangerous	  domain	  and	  host	  information.	  
 
 
10.9. 	  Encryption	  
 
Command	  and	  Control	  traffic	  can	  be	  encrypted	  to	  make	  it	  harder	  to	  detect	  and	  to	  
look	  valid.	  Negotiated	  encryption	  methods	  are	  extra	  information,	  however,	  certifi-­‐
cate	  information	  can	  be	  used	  to	  track	  the	  usage	  of	  stolen	  or	  dangerous	  certificates. 
 
Following	  command	  dumps	  all	  IP	  addresses	  that	  used	  SSL	  or	  TLS	  encryption	  and	  show	  
their	  encryption	  negotiation	  data.	  
 
ssldump -N -r capture.pcap >> ssl_negotiations_raw.txt 
 
The	  list	  of	  detected	  cipher	  suites	  can	  be	  parsed	  from	  previously	  collected	  data.	  Pre-­‐
vious	  ssl_negotitations_raw	  list	  is	  large	  so	  it	  is	  easier	  to	  filter	  interesting	  data	  from	  it	  
	   	   	  
	  
83	  
first	  and	  then	  look	  for	  details	  from	  the	  large	  file.	  Again,	  every	  cipher	  suite	  is	  reported	  
only	  once.	  
 




Certificate	  Information	  From	  Captured	  Traffic	  
 
Handshake	  certificate	  information	  can	  be	  reported	  with	  the	  following	  command.	  This	  
does	  not	  print	  the	  actual	  certificates	  but	  certificate	  names	  and	  paths.	  Old/revoked	  or	  
strange	  certificates	  should	  be	  inspected.	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11. External	  Sources	  for	  Data	  Comparison	  
	  
	  
Data	  comparison	  to	  external	  sources,	  especially	  with	  IP	  addresses	  is	  important.	  How-­‐
ever,	  lists	  are	  not	  accurate	  and	  addresses	  proven	  friendly	  today	  can	  be	  dangerous	  
tomorrow.	  Therefore	  extra	  historical	  data	  (firewall,	  proxy,	  DNS	  etc.)	  are	  valuable,	  
however,	  recent	  data	  should	  also	  be	  compared	  to	  external	  sources	  later.	  A	  home	  
country’s	  own	  IP	  addresses	  are	  not	  necessarily	  safe	  either.	  
	  
In	  an	  attempt	  to	  better	  evade	  detection,	  cybercriminals	  are	  increasingly	  
configuring	  their	  command	  and	  control	  infrastructure	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  
initial	  malware	  callbacks	  communicate	  with	  a	  server	  located	  in	  the	  
same	  country	  as	  the	  newly	  infected	  machines.	  	  	  
(Malware	  C&C	  Servers	  Found	  in	  184	  Countries)	  
	  
Tor	  network	  is	  not	  only	  a	  network	  that	  offers	  privacy	  but	  is	  also	  used	  by	  criminals	  and	  





Few	  services	  offer	  almost	  real-­‐time	  data	  about	  sites,	  domains	  and	  IP	  addresses	  that	  
spread	  malware	  intentionally	  or	  unintentionally.	  
	  
















When	  comparing	  results	  to	  these	  sites,	  it	  is	  good	  to	  remember	  that	  data	  comes	  
somewhat	  behind	  these	  services.	  Therefore,	  the	  comparison	  might	  be	  more	  valuable	  






























Methods	  and	  tools	  of	  this	  thesis	  were	  tested	  during	  normal	  audits,	  and	  results	  varied	  
from	  “everything	  is	  ok”	  to	  a	  start	  of	  incident	  management	  process.	  Usually	  findings	  
are	  old	  user	  accounts,	  a	  variety	  of	  unknown	  USB	  devices,	  bad	  system	  update	  schedul-­‐
ing,	  undefined	  logging	  policies,	  misconfigurations	  that	  slow	  down	  systems	  and	  appli-­‐
cations	  that	  phone	  home.	  	  Finding	  APT	  type	  malware	  requires	  luck	  if	  time	  for	  analysis	  
is	  short,	  since	  there	  might	  not	  be	  any	  activity	  at	  all.	  	  
	  
Even	  though	  Powershell	  is	  common	  in	  all	  modern	  Windows	  operating	  systems,	  dif-­‐
ferencies	  exist.	  For	  example,	  if	  one	  wants	  to	  check	  the	  creation	  time	  of	  registration	  
keys	  of	  USB	  device	  history,	  the	  same	  method	  does	  not	  necessarily	  work	  with	  all	  serv-­‐
er	  versions.	  	  This	  means	  that	  the	  tool	  should	  check	  its	  environment	  before	  execution	  
or	  different	  versions	  of	  the	  tools	  should	  be	  made	  for	  different	  Windows	  versions.	  Log	  
analysis	  also	  take	  100%	  of	  the	  CPU	  which	  can	  slow	  down	  other	  operations	  on	  the	  
server.	  Remote	  auditing	  (ps-­‐remoting)	  is	  not	  recommended,	  since	  after	  testing	  it	  was	  
noticed	  that	  it	  causes	  plenty	  of	  extra	  events	  and	  traffic	  to	  target	  systems.	  This	  might	  
pollute	  the	  actual	  audit	  results.	  	  Also,	  examples	  in	  this	  thesis	  do	  not	  have	  export	  op-­‐
tions	  defined.	  The	  actual	  Proof	  of	  Concept	  tool	  written	  actually	  converts	  everything	  
to	  HTML	  and	  CSV	  format.	  
	  
Linux	  systems	  are	  mostly	  used	  as	  servers,	  and	  if	  there	  are	  many	  files	  or	  shares,	  doing	  
multiple	  file	  searches	  (added	  with	  ones	  that	  are	  done	  during	  normal	  audit)	  can	  be	  
time	  consuming.	  However,	  it	  is	  the	  machine	  that	  does	  the	  work	  and	  the	  waiting	  time	  
can	  be	  used	  to	  inspect	  something	  else.	  	  It	  is	  also	  good	  practice	  to	  run	  a	  log	  analysis	  
before	  other	  systems	  commands	  that	  are	  used	  during	  the	  audit	  because	  they	  some-­‐
times	  fill	  the	  log.	  
	  
Passive	  analysis	  with	  Tshark	  is	  relatively	  easy.	  If	  there	  is	  only	  one	  or	  two	  files	  to	  be	  
analyzed	  Wireshark	  does	  the	  same	  job	  but	  not	  automatically.	  It	  was	  also	  noticed	  that	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capture	  size	  per	  file	  should	  be	  around	  2	  GB	  or	  smaller	  with	  8GB	  memory.	  The	  analy-­‐
sis	  takes	  memory	  and	  one	  Tshark	  command	  uses	  one	  CPU	  core.	  The	  largest	  data	  
amount	  that	  was	  analyzed	  was	  900	  pcap	  files	  of	  500MB	  size.	  The	  computer	  analyzed	  
this	  data	  for	  about	  15	  hours	  (during	  the	  night);	  however	  a	  great	  deal	  more	  data	  was	  
extracted	  than	  the	  presented	  examples	  in	  this	  thesis	  (for	  example	  cookies).	  	  
	  
Following	  is	  example	  from	  real	  company	  that	  was	  audited	  with	  the	  presented	  meth-­‐




Running	  Full	  Virus	  Scan	  
	  
Full	  virus	  scan	  to	  all	  computers	  (normally	  not	  executed	  during	  audit)	  crashed	  several	  
computers	  and	  alarmed	  about	  trojans.	  The	  infected	  machines	  had	  2-­‐4	  trojans	  (Java	  
exploits).	  During	  an	  offline	  scan	  from	  external	  media	  the	  same	  machines	  reported	  





Passive	  analysis	  indicated	  plenty	  of	  traffic	  to	  the	  Internet	  from	  infected	  machines.	  
Few	  machines	  not	  infected	  according	  to	  antivirus	  were	  doing	  http	  posts	  to	  external	  
servers.	  The	  posts	  were	  used	  to	  send	  files	  out	  of	  the	  company	  network	  without	  user	  
actions.	  The	  posts	  occurred	  every	  now	  and	  then,	  and	  therefore	  the	  amount	  of	  traffic	  
was	  low	  and	  did	  not	  generate	  any	  alarms	  about	  suspicious	  activity.	  The	  collected	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Vulnerability-­‐	  and	  Port	  Scans	  
	  
The	  lesson	  learned	  was	  that	  running	  vulnerability	  or	  port	  scans	  before	  operating	  sys-­‐
tem	  audit	  has	  an	  effect	  on	  system	  audit	  results.	  Most	  of	  the	  scanners	  try	  a	  different	  
kind	  of	  access	  and	  authentication	  methods	  to	  systems,	  which	  generates	  logs.	  If	  the	  




Anomalies	  From	  Operating	  Systems	  
	  
Getting	  user	  names	  from	  AD	  indicated	  that	  there	  was	  an	  old	  AD	  federation	  to	  the	  old	  
doain.	  	  What	  was	  interesting	  was	  that	  old	  accounts	  were	  still	  usable	  under	  different	  
domain	  name,	  however	  forgotten.	  With	  the	  help	  of	  log	  analysis	  it	  was	  possible	  to	  
track	  if	  any	  of	  the	  accounts	  was	  used	  by	  someone	  and	  the	  data	  was	  already	  available.	  
Computer	  login	  scripts	  were	  modified	  to	  add	  an	  admin	  user	  with	  specific	  password	  to	  
a	  local	  computer	  at	  every	  boot.	  The	  login	  script	  was	  encoded	  VBS	  and	  therefore	  
readable	  by	  default.	  The	  alwaysinstallelevated	  registry	  key	  was	  used	  to	  ease	  installa-­‐





The	  log	  analysis	  works;	  however,	  some	  results	  were	  polluted	  because	  network	  scan-­‐
ning	  and	  virus	  scanning	  were	  carried	  out	  before	  the	  operating	  system	  analysis.	  Also,	  
the	  logging	  policy	  was	  too	  loose	  in	  a	  way	  that	  some	  of	  the	  events	  were	  overwritten	  
due	  to	  file	  size	  limits.	  
	  
If	  a	  Linux	  system	  is	  doing	  command	  recording,	  log	  files	  have	  to	  be	  analyzed	  first.	  
Otherwise,	  this	  record	  is	  full	  of	  audit	  commands	  and	  the	  history	  can	  be	  lost.	  
	  





It	  can	  take	  years	  until	  system	  intrusions	  are	  revealed	  and	  attackers	  might	  have	  re-­‐
mained	  undetected	  for	  a	  long	  time.	  From	  that	  point	  of	  view,	  should	  systems	  that	  
have	  already	  been	  in	  production	  be	  inspected	  differently	  than	  in	  normal	  audit?	  	  It	  is	  
possible	  to	  detect	  anomalies	  during	  audit,	  if	  there	  is	  enough	  knowledge	  of	  the	  meth-­‐
ods	  that	  attackers	  use,	  data	  is	  collected	  in	  a	  way	  to	  be	  easily	  analyzed	  and	  compared	  
to	  private	  or	  public	  sources	  of	  intelligence.	  In	  Finland	  Finnish	  privacy	  law	  and	  usually	  
the	  time	  available	  to	  the	  audit	  limits	  chances	  to	  detect	  intrusions	  or	  other	  anomalies.	  
Due	  the	  time	  limits	  and	  amount	  of	  data,	  great	  deal	  of	  automation	  has	  to	  be	  used	  but	  
a	  skilled	  professional	  can	  usually	  point	  the	  difference	  between	  human	  made	  and	  ma-­‐
chine	  made	  actions	  better.	  Due	  to	  the	  privacy	  law	  data	  cannot	  be	  collected	  or	  ana-­‐
lyzed	  as	  thoroughly	  as	  might	  be	  required	  to	  detect	  threats	  like	  APT	  and	  therefore	  
automation	  should	  be	  used.	  And	  to	  get	  results	  from	  automation,	  specific	  information	  
like	  APT	  signatures	  are	  needed.	  	  However,	  a	  simple	  sign	  of	  anomaly	  like	  strange	  ac-­‐
count	  or	  network	  activity	  can	  give	  a	  clue.	  Also,	  the	  order	  of	  executed	  audit	  functions	  
matters.	  From	  audit	  process	  perspective	  operating	  systems	  and	  their	  logs	  should	  be	  
audited	  first	  before	  active	  actions	  like	  vulnerability	  scanning	  or	  virus	  scanning	  are	  
executed.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  data	  such	  as	  logs	  are	  lost	  or	  overwritten,	  because	  system	  
might	  not	  be	  compliant	  already	  or	  it	  is	  misconfigured.	  Before	  taking	  any	  technical	  
actions,	  auditor	  should	  verify	  that	  there	  will	  not	  be	  any	  damage	  to	  existing	  log	  data.	  
	  
Not	  all	  malware	  or	  forensics	  methods	  can	  be	  adopted	  to	  audit	  process,	  since	  they	  are	  
a	  wide	  and	  dynamic	  area	  of	  research.	  However,	  basic	  actions	  can	  be	  taken	  without	  
affecting	  audit	  costs	  or	  people’s	  privacy.	  The	  methods	  in	  this	  thesis	  are	  just	  examples	  
of	  ways	  to	  check	  certain	  kind	  of	  data	  and	  actually	  just	  samples	  of	  actual	  tests,	  and	  
these	  samples	  are	  only	  for	  mainstream	  operating	  systems	  and	  networks.	  Every	  au-­‐
dited	  target	  could	  also	  be	  analyzed	  for	  intrusions	  whether	  it	  is	  a	  firewall,	  switch	  or	  
any	  other	  special	  equipment.	  Most	  of	  the	  firewalls	  and	  big	  switches	  actually	  have	  
Linux	  or	  BSD	  as	  a	  operating	  system	  and	  therefore	  the	  same	  security	  checks	  should	  
apply	  instead	  of	  just	  checking	  configurations.	  
	   	   	  
	  
90	  
Knowledge	  to	  this	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  other	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